COLLOQUIA PERIPATETICA

BY THE LATE

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PREFATORY NOTE.

THIS volume requires a brief note in explanation. During part of the summers of 1859 and 1860, Dr. Duncan and I lived under the same roof in a seaside Fifeshire village. I was the constant companion of his waking hours. I had just left the philosophical classes of the university, and begun the study of theology; and day by day our conversations turned to those questions where Philosophy and Theology meet:—the relations of the infinite and finite, the nature of our knowledge of God, the human will in its relation to the Divine, and anthropology generally;—while I was ready, from admiration at once of his intellect, his learning, and his character, to treasure almost everything he said. Of these conversations I took rapid pencil-notes at the moment, and wrote them out in ink afterwards; and many memorable words of wisdom fell from his lips during these months of familiar intercourse and discussion. Now that we can hear him no more, I regret

that I did not carry out the notion that I had when these jottings were first taken down, of submitting them to himself for revision. But they were written in a style of short-hand intelligible only to myself, and years have passed without my encountering the labour of transcription. Any who peruse them now will, I dare say, forget the youthful hero-worship which led to such an effort to preserve his sayings, when they remember that he has left no published work behind him.

The reluctance of one, who had so much to communicate to all who would listen, to commit his thoughts to writing, was remarkable. And while many causes contributed to it, his humility was not the least of these. One who knew so many books, could not be induced to add another to the pile, unless he could say something which had not already been said. But with him has perished a breathing library of wisdom.

What are now published are memoranda of Dr. Duncan's table-talk and conversations out-of-doors, while wandering by the sea-beach and in the woods of Wemyss. He was Aristotelic in more respects than one; and many of his friends associate his most rememberable sayings with walks protracted as long as the listener could be persuaded to receive.

Necessarily these "Colloquia" are utterly mis-

cellaneous, and range over many aspects of many themes. I had thought of arranging them in something like order, under headings or in sections; but have found it impracticable. Some of his most characteristic sayings must have been left out of any such arrangement, being reducible to no special class of questions. The sequence of the thought will sometimes be scarcely apparent, but my MS. notes are often extremely disjointed. As the links of connection between successive subjects were mainly my own remarks, when first written out it seemed a work of superfluity to fill up the gaps.

A sentence which was interjected in the conversation has, however, been occasionally inserted, but only where it seems helpful to the understanding of Dr. Duncan's remarks. I need hardly add that there is no "conversation" given in full (excepting in the case of a friend whom I took, at his request, to visit Dr. Duncan in Edinburgh in the year 1861, some of whose words I have taken down, as well as Dr. Duncan's replies—pp. 94-107). This fact will explain the frequent chasms and breaks in the continuity of his talk, and also its occasional repetitions. Only a part of what I have in MS. is now published.

It always seemed to me that Dr. Duncan needed a quasi-antagonist to bring out his most characteristic sayings. He had to feel that he

was clearing up a labyrinth, or imparting instruction, or exposing a sophism, or meeting one who differed from him, but was on the same track of inquiry, before his mind was stirred to full activity and productiveness.

Dr. Duncan was essentially a modern Rabbi. He gave forth his sayings with the slow and measured emphasis of a Master to disciples. In familiar conversation it was the same as in the class-room. His thoughts naturally took an aphoristic form; and sometimes they were less utterances for others than audible soliloquy. But brevity and sententious fulness always characterised them. The thought might penetrate to that shadowy region where language almost breaks down in the effort, as he put it, "to say the unsayable;" but, as he condensed the thought, or rather enshrined it in some short compact aphorism, you always felt the influence of Aristotle. His own eulogy of that great master of the precise (see p. 22) might with strictness be applied to himself. He never used superfluous phrases, and some of his sentences sparkle like cut crystal in their clearness. He was a schoolman in his love of distinctions, and refined shades of meaning—at times supersubtile for other minds. One of his colleagues, who taught philosophy in Edinburgh, and whose mind was the exact antithesis of his, once remarked, that "when he held up Dr. Duncan's

subtile distinctions, often so scholastically exact, before the steady light of consciousness, they usually vanished in mist." But the Rabbi's mind was of another order from his critic's. He was a passionate lover of systematic thought, and a "master of sentences." A strong logician, with a keen sense of the unfathomable, he had an equal relish for the clear and the indubious; and however high he soared, he tried to put the results of all his thinking within the framework of intelligible propositions. In him we might say (as he would have said of another), that the Patristic, the Scholastic, and the Puritan, were finely blended; while the Philosophic underlay these three, and broke through the crust of received convictions, in jets of most delicate insight; and his love for the "Biblical concrete" coloured and moulded them all. There were flashes of quaintest mediævalism, with "modern touches here and there," in all his deep analyses of the data of human Faith and Knowledge; and though a schoolman, the classic glow had not died away from his language as it did from the style of Lombard and Aquinas.

It is scarcely possible for any memorial of Dr. Duncan to do full justice to the many-sidedness of his nature. Of many we feel, that their writings are better than themselves; *his* spoken words most imperfectly shadowed forth the uniqueness of the man. The most common-

place remark in conversation his mind took up, and returned, as it were, to the speaker, lit, brightened, vivified by the glow it had caught at the fire within his spirit; while the patience he showed to others, who returned him his own original remarks reduced to commonplace, was equally characteristic of the man. He never made men feel the sense of an interval between them and him, because, in his humility, he was himself unaware of its existence. His life remains to be written; and his friends, with the pupils who sat at his feet, and reverenced his character, will be glad to know that an extended Memoir of him is in course of preparation. The biography of one who was at once a philosopher and a scholar, a theologian and one of the humblest of Christians, should be an invaluable gift to this age.

This little volume is a mere collection of fragments—Deep-sea Soundings, we may call them. They skirt the margin of many great questions, and enter the very heart of others. Casually, and sometimes fitfully, the plummet is let down; and, while the water is deep, you feel that he has either touched the bottom, or reported why he cannot reach it.

In all our conversations, he made no attempt to draw out an *exhaustive* chart of theological doctrine. He had a very distinct theological map of his own. The territory laid down on

that map had a clear boundary-line, and the sceptre of Augustine ruled over it. But there were frontier lands into which he occasionally went, and he would draw no strict line of demarcation. As to philosophy, he always avowed himself to be without a system; and yet there will be found, even in these pages, scintillations at least of a fuller speculative system than he allowed to be possible. There was so much of the philosophical sceptic in Dr. Duncan, along with tenderest religious faith and humblest love (a union in which he resembled Pascal), that he had almost a disinclination to *try* to exhaust a speculative problem; and, after sounding here and sounding there, he turned from it to where he found securer footing—the revelation which God has made to us in history, and in His Son.

WILLIAM KNIGHT.

DUNDEE, *May* 1870.

COLLOQUIA PERIPATETICA.

[PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM AND THEOLOGY.]

I AM a philosophical sceptic, who have taken refuge in Theology. I ascend to God. Reason, in some way unknown to me, "overleaps itself." I agree with the Transcendentalists in this; and if we are "made in the image of God," we can reach and positively apprehend Him in whose image we are made. I postulate God, and out of this postulate any philosophy I have emerges.

[It is altogether deductive then?]

It is deductive from that point. If we do not assume God, and reason downwards from that assumption, I doubt we will never rise to Him at all. Once a man has said his "credo," and especially if his creed has been christened, he may build his philosophy as high as heaven. The tendency of all my thinking is not to look upwards from man to God, but downwards from God to man.

[But, as we are not divine, how do you get *up* in the first instance?]

I cannot tell you; *only, I am up.* Probably it is by instinct. Say, if you choose, that reason has overleapt itself. I find that I cannot

bridge the gulf between the creature and a Creator, the many and the One, in my ascent, so I endeavour to do so in my descent.

[But you must ascend in some way, before you *can* descend.]

I must *start* from theology; for *I am a born philosophical sceptic, but once I am theological I am sceptical no more.* But I only part company with the sceptic by recovering my philosophical faith, on a theological basis.

[Well, but you take this theological faith as the final utterance of your own nature, when consciousness is analysed?]

No; it is not the verdict of my own nature, it is something higher than that. You tell me that this or that is the voice of Nature, and that we can't help believing it. But does this Reidist solution really satisfy any man? The belief may be false, though we cannot help believing it? May not some malign being, a κακοδαίμων, have created us, or such a demiourgos as the Gnostics believed in. Can't-help-myself-ism is to me a very shallow philosophy. But if I am "made in the image of God," my philosophy is under-propped by theology, and the truth of what my nature avers is guaranteed to me.

[But who guarantees you this fact, from which you start? Must you not fall back, after all, upon the consciousness, lit up by evidence from without? The very nature you turn from is our ultimate court of appeal, and so you reason in a circle.]

No: there is no circle; for God is apprehended within the soul of man, as the archetype of ex-

istence. We do not infer his being from what we are. We cannot rise to Him thus. But He is himself within us. *His* voice, not the voice of consciousness, may be heard. But, Revelation apart, I am a sceptic, *i.e.* I am a philosophical sceptic. Sextus Empiricus was long my delight, I used to read the ancient sceptics and dogmatists, just to pit one against another in glorious war, and strove to beat them all to the dust, like so many ninepins. Sextus himself was the ball amongst the ninepins. A good history of previous philosophies is to be found in his treatise Πρὸς τοὺς μαθηματικούς, just because he was himself a sceptic.

[On the Nature and Origin of Evil.]

I CANNOT get out of the meshes of Augustinianism on the privative nature of sin. Evil is a defect, just as death is a privation, the loss of what once was, and therefore of what is needful for health and completion of existence. Inanimation is the negation of life, and what death physical is to the body—viz. the withdrawal of life, sin is to the soul, the withdrawal of its life. God is not the author of sin, because sin has no author. Sin is an off-cutting, a degeneracy, a cancer, or corruption consequent on privation. And just as a new chemistry begins on the death of the body, the chemistry of inanimates; for want of a better, I take this crude analogue of physical death and dismemberment, upon which a new chemistry supervenes, to shadow forth the nature of sin. . . . . . I observe that Julius Müller disowns the Augus-

tinian doctrine. But how does he save himself from Manichæism. It was to escape from Manichæism that Augustine adopted his theory. That theory is certainly necessary to support the strong position of Rutherford in his work, *De Providentia,* that God is the author of all entitive acts. He that affirms that must be a decided Augustinian; for no pious man could affirm that God is the author of sin. As darkness is the privation of light, and death the absence of life, sin is the privation of good.

[You used* the symbol of a cancer that would consume all existence, if it had the free range of the universe. Is it easier to conceive the origin of a defect under the symbol of disease, than of a positive revolt?]

No. But I used that symbol to suggest more strongly the notion of the *privative* nature of evil, as against a merely negative conception, and of a privative effect in a being created with a moral nature, and essential activity.

[By "essential activity" do you mean "free-will"?]

Well, "activity" is a more generic word than freewill. But perhaps the phrase, "moral nature and essential activity," is a tautology, for the one may involve the other. But the use of the latter term instead of the word "freewill" keeps us clear of a knotty controversy . . . . I would not object to say that sin is *first* privative, and *then* positive; but its privative nature is its profoundest; and when profoundly looked at does not sin appear more awful on that than

* In a previous conversation.

on any other theory of it? For it appears in its essential nature as absolute *malitia*, which, if unchecked, would go to the extinction of all being, and of God himself. There is no doubt that all sin designs deicide. All sin is directed against universal being. It is primarily against God, inferentially against all being. It seeks to slay Being at the root.

[It is not so consciously.]

No. But this is very much because of the sinner's notion of God being false. He would not kill the God of his own fancy. He would only kill the God that *is*.

[But if the wrongdoer is not conscious that his sin designs deicide, he cannot be responsible for its being so, even if it is so.]

A man is not conscious of this till he gets familiar with the character of God, and the closer he comes to God, the more will his sin appear to him to attempt a virtual deicide. All transgression is ambitious, and if it could succeed it would scale the universe and dethrone its monarch. But as to its essence and its origin, beyond this that I have said, it always seems to me that our speculations are directed to find the rationale of the only irrational thing in the universe, and of the only thing that has *no cause*. Suppose it to have one; well, is not that causal volition of the creature a sin, equally with all that follows from it? If so, whence came it? From God? μὴ γένοιτο· If not from God, whence? *From naught.*

[That is, you break the causal nexus.]

Of course I do, as regards the sin. It is cause-

less and irrational. It is monstrosity—a thing horrible in a God-made universe, just *because* it is causeless.

[We must distinguish between the act of sin, and the sin that is in the act. The power to act, and the act itself which is morally colourless as an act (*actus purus*), must be caused. Is it only the moral quality that you reckon uncaused?]

Yes. I don't suppose that any good thing is causeless, though done by the creature, its moral quality is not causeless. It is only evil that has no cause, and hence its enormity.

[But do you not weaken the sense of responsibility by the theory that the evil *per se* is causeless. And can you split up our actions into two parts, and considering them on the one hand simply as acts, and on the other as moral phenomena, regard them as so far caused, and so far uncaused?]

Certainly; I agree with Rutherford that God is the author of all entitive acts. But He is not the author of sin; and as He is the author and source of the creature, He is by implication the author of all that His creature does, and therefore of evil, if evil be anything positive. Again and again I come back to it, "Nemo de me quærat efficientem causam malæ voluntatis: non enim est efficiens sed deficiens; quia nec illa effectio est, sed defectio."* I am still drawn to Augustine, for all that Müller has to say against him. He was a philosopher, while a Manichee, and as a philosopher he held fast to the causal nexus:

* Aug. *De Civit. Dei*, xii. 7.

but, on renouncing Manichæism, he admitted its violation; and I don't see how, if you hold fast to the causal nexus, you can account for the entrance of sin, or rather you *can* show that it *could not enter.*

[Is not causation altogether a mystery? Have we any right to affirm that the nexus between volitions is broken on the introduction of evil?]

We must do so, or become Manichæan, and charge its entrance upon God. I suppose, however, that Manichæism was a revolt in the interest of morality, against the immorality of our antecedent pantheism. I am inclined to think that a pantheistic scheme of absorption, or nihilism, must have preceded Zoroastrianism, which was a speculative advance upon the former system. And Manichæism was only a revived Zoroastrianism; it was just the introduction of the Persian philosophy into Christianity. For Ormuzd was a perfectly good being; but as evil existed as a fact (and holding fast by this was the moral element in Manichæism), *and as the causal nexus could not be broken,* there must be an entirely and eternally bad being, to produce the evil. I believe that it was in the interest of morals that this revolt was determined both in the first principles of the system, and of its virtual tendency. The later system was a revolt from a grosser system. Manichæism was not a retrograde but a progressive movement, for with all its absurdities it sought in Ormuzd a being morally perfect. We can see how a purer ethic might

arise from this position. There is at least *one* being absolutely good. . . . It is noteworthy that pantheism, by abolishing moral distinctions, is closely allied to polytheism—pantheism, the creed of the refined; polytheism, the religion of the herd.

I'M first a Christian, next a Catholic, then a Calvinist, fourth a Pædobaptist, and fifth a Presbyterian. I cannot reverse this order.

[Some one suggested that these were like circles within each other, the first the widest and the best.]

I like better to think of them as towers rising one above the other, though narrowing as they rise. The first is the broadest, and is the foundation laid by Christ; but we are to build on that foundation, and, as we ascend, our outlook widens.

THERE is a progressive element in *all* things, and therefore in religion; though I am much more of a conservative in Theology than in Philosophy, or in Politics, or in anything else. There we have a "foundation laid." But we have no political Bible, no philosophical Scriptures, no scientific infallible writings. And yet we are now in an older age of the world than the apostolic. It is a mistake to look to the Fathers as our seniors. They were our juniors. The Church has advanced wonderfully since its foundation was laid. Polycarp would have stood a bad chance in an examination by John Owen. I think I could have posed him myself.

Finest devout men these old Christians were. But what did they do? They came together, and prayed, and read a great deal of Scripture, and sang, and talked, and went away again, and fell to tent-making: then came back, and read, and prayed, and sang, and so forth.

And yet the conservative element is always good. Each age needs some men to go back into antiquity, and jealously to guard its treasures, that they be not lost; and this is always good if we are not bigotedly conservative—*i.e.* blind to progressive light. It is true that to many the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness comprehends it not. But there is a destructive school of progress that I cannot endure. It would simply destroy the past to make way for itself. Conservatism alone, and by itself, is obstructive; Neoterism alone, and by itself, is destructive.

CALVINISM. There's no such thing as Calvinism. The teachings of Augustine, Remigius, Anselm, and Luther, were just pieced together by one remarkable man, and the result baptized with his name. Augustine taught and developed the doctrine of salvation by grace and the Divine election; Remigius, particular redemption; Anselm, the doctrine of vicarious atonement; and Luther, that of justification by faith.

I THINK I'm a *high* Calvinist. I have no objection to the *height* of the Calvinists; but I have objections to the miserable narrowness

of some, the miserable narrowness. As Calvinism rises to the infinite, it can't be too high. But it must not be like a single pillar rising up to heaven, not even like a steeple, but a church. And I have no objection to the crypts below. There is a subterranean region underneath our creeds; only I'm satisfied, if they rise up to the light.

A GOOD way of determining the progressive landmarks of Theology might be by selecting typical texts to describe the points made emphatic by the principal teachers of the Church. Thus, to take only six. I would connect the name of *Athanasius* with the words, "Go ye into all the world, teaching and baptizing, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:" *Augustine*, with the words, "By grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God;" "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly;" etc.: *Anselm*, with the words, "Christ suffered for our sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God:" *Remigius*, "I am the good shepherd; the good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep. My sheep hear my voice," etc.: *Luther*, "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the

works of the law; for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified:" and *Calvin*, "Blessed be God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love."

I MUST be charitable, but I must have a radix to my charity. The ἀγάπη must be based upon the πίστις.

OPTIMISM. You call it the correlative of Theism. Well, I would say, beware of making the one the entrance to the other. I have all my life been hanging about the doors, but I have not yet gone in. I think we may be content to remain still at the door a little longer; a little longer, till we're done with the darkness.

[The aphorism that "repentance is better than innocence," was quoted as the kernel of Dr. Bruce's preaching, and as affording one ray of light as to the permission of evil and the theory of optimism.]

Well, there is great truth in that. I have no objection to Dr. B.'s kernel. But I find that kernel enclosed in a shell, and the shell is, "as far as man is concerned."

ARIANISM. I've been in all the heresies but two. I've *lived* in them all, without exception, but in two, with which I have never had any affinity. These are Arianism, and ——. Arianism is a very meagre patchwork. If we are to be saved, it must be by God, or by man

(and how grandly by the God-man). But that it should be by one, neither God nor man, neither one nor other, not part of both, nor wholly both, nor wholly one of the two, but wholly neither, and, therefore, with no real affinity with either of them;—that system has no attractions for me. Let who choose go to it. I cannot, and never could.

I AM becoming more and more in love with a good bone of fact. I've been too speculative and abstract all my life, and I am now, in my old years, seeing the wisdom of clinging to the facts,—the bones. The mystical dreamer and the abstract mind both shun the facts, and in consequence the mystic often becomes a flabby molluscous sort of creature. There are some Christians whom I could describe only as soft pulpy molluscs. And yet their mollusc lives are curious. See the limpet's suction. So some of the most curious spiritual creatures cling to that rock, which is Christ. You may kick them, and they'll only cling the firmer; ay, and with some of them, it is only the knife, or death by stoning, that will remove them from "that Rock." There's a law of compensation everywhere.

IN one sense, I am not an Eclectic; in another sense I am. I cannot huddle systems and bits of systems into a mass, apart from their organic connections, and the vital relations of Truth with Truth. I cannot merely juxta-place, and leave the dogmas in a

row. But, on the other hand, there is nothing in this world completely false. There is no *whole lie* that I know of but the Sceptic's; and even his is not utterly a lie, or it would never have existed. Undoubtedly all errors are abused truths. But then half a truth is also at the same time half a lie. Now I don't like halves. Give me entireties, unities, wholes.

THERE is fine poetry in some of our Scotch paraphrases.

> "So days, and years, and ages past,
> Descending down to night,
> Can henceforth never more return
> Back to the gates of light."

That is very fine poetry. But it was born in Hellas, and never visited Judea. Now we are to sing the songs of Sion. "Gates of light!" I begin to think of Aurora, fair daughter of the dawn! On the whole, I prefer the Psalms to the Paraphrases and Hymns. They call them paraphrases *or translations*—and queer translations some of them are. If they had given me translations, I would have let them keep their paraphrases to themselves. But George Buchanan's psalms are magnificent; perhaps the finest translations that we have. They are literal, and yet imaginative. Yet he errs sometimes by being ultra-classical, as when he addresses God "O Rex Olympi." The Roman Church, even, would have used his psalms, had not their author been a heretic. So one of the popes (Urban VIII.) said. They found nothing

amiss in the doctrine introduced—only the book was the production of a heretic. A miserable reason! It's the best compensation for heresy to turn a heretic's book to a good purpose. Buchanan would have got great advancement in the Church, had he only truckled to them. What a contrast to Erasmus, his illustrious brother in scholarship. Poor Erasmus truckled all his life for a hat. If he could only have been made a cardinal! You see the longing for it in his very features, and can't help regarding him with mingled respect and pity. But few men do justice to Erasmus.

A'KEMPIS—a fine fellow, but hazy, and weak betimes. He and his school tend (as some one has well said) to make humility and humiliation exchange places.

I HAVE three synthetic unities:—

(1.) The Trinity in unity. God the Father, God the Son, and God the Spirit.

(2.) The dual unity in the person of Christ the God-man.

(3.) The manifold unity of the Mystical Union, Christ and his Church.

I am disposed to consider the mystical union as something midway between the Incarnation of Christ and the Regeneration of his Church. It is the connecting-link, and therefore neither the one nor the other. It is Christ becoming incarnate to regenerate man, and so commencing the process with his Incarnation. Then the mystical union began. From that it dates.

INDIVIDUALITY is the basis of all noble character. I like to see a good block of it in all men. But there is an ultra-individualism which may be a very bad thing. A man who does not feel the tie of a common connection with his race, who is not like the vulgar herd of us, may find a greater difficulty in admitting our common depravity. And a man who does not feel this keenly, but who feels, as it were, cut off from his kind by force of his individuality, may find a stumbling-block in the doctrine of a common atonement, the very same for all of us. But we are not only all indebted to another, but the same provision is made for the general mass of the race, and for the most marked individual in it. And unity is as great and as wonderful as variety and individuality are. There's a tree. It is diverse from every other tree, yet it is a unity, and it came from a seedling, which connects it with the genus tree and with its own species: and so the umbilicus is a wonderful thing. The race is one, till it is severed. God has made of one blood all the nations of the earth.

I DO not wonder that there are infidels, because the two greatest facts in our religion seem to be a denial of all moral government whatever. 1st, That the guilty, and the fearfully guilty, should be freely pardoned; and 2d, That the only perfect innocent in the universe should be the greatest sufferer in the universe. But how does Socinus get over this latter fact?

The fact is unquestioned that he did suffer, and the fact is unquestionable that he was innocent. *Why then did he suffer?* if not vicariously. Was it for an example of patience? All that for a sample! But it is a truth, becoming more and more evident to me as time passes, that "no man can call Jesus *Lord*, but by the Holy Ghost;" and I am prepared to prove it. For what is it to call Jesus Lord? It is to *worship* him. Either, then, Christ is God, or he is not. If he is not, and if we worship him, we are idolaters. And how can a man be absolutely certain that he is no idolater, or worshipper of man, in worshipping one who was essentially man, whatever else he was? He cannot, unless he is taught it from above. . . The Jewish mind is essentially fixed in the notion that we Christians worship three gods, and that one of them is a man, and therefore that we are idolaters. In discussing theology with the Hungarian Jews, I never could get this driven out of them.

THE Gospel is not a mere remedial system. Christ came into the world that we might have life, and that we might have it more abundantly. Mark, περισσοτέρως. There's deep significancy there. It would not suffice merely to give us back the thing we had lost. That would be much, and more than we deserved, but not enough for God to give, because not an advancement to man, and an increase to his glory. And, I would say it reverently, but without hesitation, it is a good thing that Adam fell, because what he lost is much more

than found, or rather, something superlatively better has been found. There's your optimism *now;* and in this connection I agree with John Bruce in his repentance doctrine. Repentance is better than innocence; not abstractly, but so far as man is concerned. Augustine says, "Bonum est mala fieri." My principles lead me to "Bonum est ut mala permissa sint;" not, you observe, "usque permissa sint," for that would abolish the eternal distinction between good and evil. But, though I tremble while I utter it, "bonum est ut mala sint."

THE "Te Deum" is a grand piece of writing; by far the finest fragment of post-apostolic devotion. I am particularly fond of these lines—"Thou art the King of Glory, O Christ. Thou art the Everlasting Son of the Father. When thou tookest upon thee to deliver man, thou didst not abhor the Virgin's womb. When thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death, thou didst open the kingdom of Heaven to all believers." The Te Deum must be very old. It was sung at Augustine's ordination, but it is much older. I think Hilary of Poictiers was possibly the author. No one can tell the influence of that hymn during the fourteen centuries it has been in use. But one of the finest devotional pieces I know occurs in the "Missale Romanum." It is in the "Mass of the Presanctified" for Good Friday, in which the refrain occurs—"Quid feci tibi populo meo?" It is clear to my mind that the *service* of the Low Mass preceded the *dogma,* and perhaps it was so

also in the High Mass. In one respect the Scottish Episcopal communion-office is more objectionable than the Roman, for it leaves out the "nobis" of the Missale Romanum. There are magnificent prayers in the missal. They are chiefly relics of a very early and much purer age; and many a good Romanist gets on very well in his Church by the help of these alone.

THE Council of Trent says that Christ merited that we should merit. Thus there is no merit that is not ultimately resolvable into that which is meritoriously causal of all merit. They say that if you deny that the saints have merit, you're a heretic. But if you deny that Christ's merits merited their merit, you're a heretic too; which, as John Owen says, is all that many good Protestants would contend for. . . . . Bellarmine was not the worst kind of Papist—far from it; but he always raises a desperate cuttle-fish confusion about him, and then puts out his claw and drags. Priest G—— of L—— is just a modern edition of Bellarmine. He preaches, "so rich are the merits of Christ, that they put into us the capacity of meriting." They merit that we merit. It is a merit of congruity, not of condignity, that they contend for, and they admit that *gratia prima* must assist us all. Now, since Bellarmine and he deny the merit of condignity, and so do we, we are in the main at one. But what this merit of congruity is I have never been able to see, nor do I expect ever to see.

JOHN OWEN has vigorous thoughts, but the baldest style I know. But better rough speech than an oleaginous style. If rough it may arrest. In Owen were combined the Patristic, the Reformed, and the Puritanic. He was a scholar, and had a fine *subactum judicium.* He was a good student of texts. But oh, he moves clumsily. He moves like a whale. Robert Hall called his works a "continent of mud." He utterly lacked the æsthetic, which Hall valued highly; but he is a good specimen of the Patristic Scholastic Puritan; and he is great in spiritual analysis. If you read him on the "Mortification of sin," you must prepare yourself for the scalpel. He is at the head of a school of divines. Halyburton and Witsius were decided Owenians. They are minor men, and you more easily get at their centre.

WE need a more forward-moving Christianity, with more of the πληροφορίᾳ πίστεως in it; which is not "in full assurance of faith," but "in the full sail of faith,"—bearing right on with the wind; all canvas up.

WE must mark the difference between minds wishing to "add to their faith knowledge," and minds wishing to drag all faith to the bar of knowledge—the difference between wishing to found faith upon philosophy, and to deepen faith by philosophy. We *must* analyse our faith as far as we can. No rational man will resist that. And we must systematise all our knowledge. We must keep our faith

orderly, by rational methods, while we "give unto Faith the things that are Faith's." Philosophy was born a pagan, but she may become Christian, and should be christened "Mary." She may be proud to sit at Jesus' feet. Hellas coming to Judea's Messiah is a rarely beautiful sight. But Judea is also the better of going to Greece. For what is our New Testament system but Hebrew thought in a Greek clothing. The Hebrew affords the concrete matter, but it puts on the raiment of the Greek form.

TWO things strike me in that wonderful sermon of Paul at Athens. His considerate tact, recognising all the good he found in Athens, and how he laid the axe to the root of the tree of Attic pride. The Athenians prided themselves on four things—(1.) That they were autochthons. Paul tells them that "God made the world and *all things that are therein.*" (2.) Their grand temple architecture. Paul tells them "The Lord of heaven and earth dwelleth not in temples made with hands." (3.) Their distinction from all "barbarians." "He hath made of one blood all nations of men." (4.) Their chronology and grand antiquity. "He hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation." Why! that's what they had been all wrangling about since the days of Herodotus.

THERE is a very close affinity between a metaphysical Philosophy and Theology. Plato has great affinities with Christianity, and

so have all the succeeding Platonists more or less, especially our own Cambridge men in the 17th century. But many a so-called Christian teacher is not better than a second-rate heathen moralist, nor half so good. He dilutes the essence with so much water. Plato almost anticipated St. Paul's "Oh, wretched man that I am!" The ancient moralists were far better theologians than either the Priests or the Poets; (Pindar, however, takes some noble flights). Seneca used to be a great favourite of mine, but the Platonist is nearer of kin to the Christian than the Stoic is, as most of the Fathers allowed.

YOU say that Design never leads to the Infinite, and it never yields the idea of creation. I would add that it never gives me the Infinite, *because* it never gives me creation. If I reach the fact of creation I reach the Infinite; for the infinite Power alone is creative. The origin of an atom, equally with that of the Universe—(*i.e.* what I may call the Universe, but then my universe may be God's atom)—gives me the notion of power that is truly and perfectly infinite.

PANTHEISM has a curious natural affinity with man, when he realises his connection with the Universal life, Ἐν αὐτῷ ἐσμέν. We live within God's omnipresence, and we have come *from* Him. There is something in Pantheism so deep that naught in bare Deism

can meet it. Deism is not so deep. And Pantheism may well keep the house, till a stronger than Deism comes to take possession of it. In Jesus Christ I find the only solution of the mystery. *He* was not one with the race, though kindred to it. I admit that Pantheism is a vulgar scheme at bottom; yet the least vulgar and most pious minds will often talk pantheistically, and *perhaps* they must do so; (I'm fond of the caveats:) just as those most remote from anthropomorphism very often talk most anthropomorphically. And the most transcendental minds can easily afford this. You will find them talking either very abstractly or very concretely. In the poets, in Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Thomson, you find much Pantheistic language, but no Pantheism. I was a Spinosist for three years. The ONE was then the ALL to me. But I had to throw the system to the winds that I might live. I believe there are many good Pantheists, but conscience has no speculative warrant in the system of Pantheism. . . . And yet I think that the system is an emphatic admission, or rather proclamation, that there is a secret in the Universe that belongeth unto God, unfathomed and fathomless by men.

[IN THE CAVE, UNDER MACDUFF'S CASTLE, WEMYSS.

THAT'S a wonderful illustration of Plato's about the cave, and the shadows on the wall. A better symbol of the contrast between the permanent and the transitory could not be

found. The moving shadows seen, while that of which they are the adumbration is not seen. But as a writer I prefer Aristotle to Plato. Aristotle's Greek is very amazing. It is the *exactest* Greek I know. He is by far the compactest and most precise writer we have in any literature. He is the *beau ideal* of the precise. Two things I wonder at in Aristotle—the extent of his acquirements and the exactitude of his writing. He had gone over the encyclopædia of knowledge. And the "Organon" is marvellous Greek. So is the "Nicomachean Ethics." He is not so great I think in his "Metaphysics," either in the matter or its form. —I sometimes wonder if we have much of his Esoteric—those peripatetic disclosures to the initiated. It is mostly the exoteric I suppose. But if *that* was the exoteric *what must the Esoteric have been!* His æsthetic doctrines too have not yet been superseded, though they have been supplemented. And we have a curious fragment of his own poetry, a piece περὶ Ἀρετῆς. It is Smollett-like; very like Smollett's "Ode to Independence." But I never could love Aristotle. Admiration is the beginning, middle, and end of my feeling towards him. He could see, but could not soar. He could see, I suppose, as far as a mason could see into a wall that he had built, and that is a good deal farther than other people see into it. Plato, on the other hand, I love. He is more of the mystic, and he soars sublimely. Plato goes peering up, often into cloudland; yet I like to follow him into the mist, for when I don't see through it,

I generally think *he* does. It is a good thing to go up now and then into the mist, if we do not, like Ixion, embrace the cloud. . . . Philip of Macedon had been a wise man in getting such a tutor as Aristotle for Alexander. The tutorship may account a little for the greatness of both men. Each benefited the other. But what a petty ambition was that of the ward; and what a low Empire compared with the tutor's, in worth and in duration both. To conquer the world! Alexander Magnus was, after all, Alexander Parvus too.

[Sir W. Hamilton and Knowledge of the Infinite.]

I HAVE never read Sir William; yet we have many affinities, I think. I cannot now make use of a new terminology. He has one of his own, very good, I suppose; but I have my own. We met only once at Fairlie. I greatly enjoyed his conversation. He bothered me that day about the contradictions in the four evangelists. He gave a list of them; but I told him I thought the whole matter a very small affair. I think I hold a theory of Ignorance not essentially different from his. But it is no new thing to hold a theory of Ignorance. It is a theological commonplace. I sometimes wish Sir William were still alive, that I might have a talk with him about Positives and Negatives, and my own Positivo-negative. For, so far as I can see, there is nothing in his doctrine of Faith and Knowledge different from this, that

there is a distinction between the *com*prehension and the *ap*prehension of things. The rest I take to be a dispute about the two different meanings of the word "know." I do not *know* the Infinite, says Sir William, excepting negatively. We know only the finite; but in the consciousness of our inability to transcend the finite, we are inspired with a *belief* in the unconditional and the infinite, and we positively believe in it. Well, I say, we *do* know it, only not comprehensively but apprehensively, as much as we know the reality of Finite *Substance.* We cannot compass either of them in thought, but we *know that they are.* We apprehend, or know, the positive fact of their existence. Now, I say, if this be all that Sir William meant, and we are agreed so far, why deviate from common parlance, and say we do not *know* them? The common consciousness of men is the same as that to which Sir W. appeals. And if the majority of men (I mean of the uneducated) express themselves by saying that they *know*, why should not I? I admit that we do not comprehend the noumenal, only the phenomenal. Yet we *know* that the noumenal *is.* You may say you attain to the one by positive knowledge, and to the other, in the collapse of knowledge, by positive faith. I say I want a common term for both, and that I find this in the word "know." Well, we just speak different languages about the same old problem, as if Sir William spoke in Greek and I in old Saxon. A new philosophy very often just speaks a new dialect; very often it is a mere

question of vocabulary and nomenclaturing! Yet I won't give up my positivo-negative. I cannot exhaust the infinite in thought; that is, I am unable by the negation of it to exhaust a positive. . . . It would seem, then, that my "scimus" is wider than Sir William's, and my "ignoramus" narrower. I maintain that we do know the infinite as a positivo-negative, or we have no basis for revelation; or, I would state it thus, we are not properly *ignorant* of it as a positive, we are only *nescient.* Ignorance is a defect, nescience is not a necessary defect. Christ was nescient, but not ignorant; for the latter is that beyond which there is a better—not only absolutely but relatively; better that is, for that particular state. Now there is a better state than nescience absolutely; but not relatively, to man.

WHEN at the Grammar School in Aberdeen, I got hold of a volume of George Campbell's, in which he ridicules, as lamentable folly, the notion that to God there is no past, present, or future—to Him all are one. I remember well how I *abhorred* George Campbell for that. I thought it the most magnificent thought I had ever met with.

OPPOSITE errors have generally a common πρῶτον ψεῦδος. Legalism and antinomianism rise from a common root of error, just as Materialism and Idealism respectively ignore the balance of the universe, and that "all things are double, one against the other."

LUTHER and Melancthon. If a subject could be split up into twelve separate points, and also compressed into one, Luther would take the one, Melancthon the twelve.

CHALMERS was not a widely-read divine, but as a practical thinker and teacher of the heart he was unrivalled. We have lost much of him for want of a Boswell. Many of his best sayings are gone for ever. As a man of erudition he might have been better. As a heaven-taught man, he needed little. Though not well read, all his reading passed through the alembic of his own mind. What he took in from without never came forth undigested. . . . . But Chalmers never could understand the real difficulty of the Edwardean controversy. It was very poor insight in him to imagine that he had settled the controversy. He and I often talked of Edwards and Philosophical Necessity. He never could see that there was a third thing between Necessity and Contingency—viz. Liberty. Chalmers was not a speculative thinker; but he was especially great in all questions where the heart aids the intellect. A minister once told me of the fine rebuke he got from him. He had visited a man on his death-bed who was delirious, and returning home met Chalmers. "Well," said he, "did you pray with him?" "No; he was delirious; but I prayed with the family." "Ah! you did very wrong, sir. Who knows but that some old train of thought might have been stirred

up by the tones of a familiar voice? You did very wrong, sir?" In that region Chalmers was one of the greatest men of our century.

[IN REFERENCE TO A LIVING PREACHER.]

HE *Morelled* too much for me. That is a very shallow book of Morell's on Religion. He may call it the philosophy of religion; but I doubt if it is anything else than cloudification.

[OPEN QUESTIONS.]

I WOULD not put Augustine's doctrine of evil into the Church's creed. I have no right to impose it on others. I think it is an essential. But into the "credo" I do not thrust it. Systematic theology has a wide margin round it, where we must have the *probabilia* placed; but the creed should have none. A narrow theology, founded on the theologian's idiosyncrasies, is, after all, no theology at all.

I DISSENT from Jonathan Edwards' doctrine, because he hazards a speculation on will *qua* will, and therefore in reference to all will, divine and human. It is fatal to establish a necessary chain throughout every will in the universe. The Divine acts are free. They are necessary, I maintain, *qua* moral, though free *qua* will. But I am a determinist as much as Edwards.

ARMINIANISM and Antinomianism have a common πρῶτον ψεῦδος. Antinomianism says that we (to use the words of Towne) are

Christ-ed and God-ed. Arminianism says that half of the work is God's and half is man's. Calvinism asserts that the whole is God's, and the whole is man's also. The second scheme robs God; the first fanaticises man; the third is the *juste milieu*, and stands midway between two ultras. I admit moral power in the will, against the Antinomians, and claim it: I abjure power, against the Arminians, and disown it. The Arminian synergia is first, unconsciously, atheistic; and then, consciously, enthusiastic. It first excludes and denies God, and then attributes to Him and to man an act of fanaticism. It would be better to abolish the word synergia, for it is associated with a controversy, on one side of which I take a decided stand. But I have no objection to use it, as it contains a truth. Allow my caveat, and I'll use your word. There is a true and a false synergia. That God works half, and man the other half, is false; that God works all, and man does all, is true. God ἐνεργεῖ τὸ θέλειν; man θέλει καὶ ἐνεργεῖ. I have my theologoumenon, or philosophical speculation on the will—that it is set free from the bondage of antecedence and consequence as these reign in Nature. The *nexus* in the two spheres is not identical. We might even say with Pope, "who binding Nature fast in fate, left free the human will." And yet I am a determinist with Edwards, as against Whitby; while I am an assertor of freedom with Whitby, as against Edwards. The free will which I concede and maintain is just *the reason's postulate for the*

dictamina of conscience. But as to the causal nexus being entirely broken, or as to our power of origination—what Sir W. Hamilton would regard as proximate in the conscience as to the will, is amongst my *ultima dubia.* And, after all, my theologeme "de voluntate" is amongst the 999 unsolved things which I ever carry with me. . . . . I grant the existence of "remote power" as a condition of responsibility; but this power is inoperative until quickened by the ray from above. We differ in fundamentals if you hold a full συνέργεια, as was maintained in the synergist controversy. But the problem as to what this remote power, which conditions responsibility, is, is a metaphysical one; and I think that, as metaphysicians, we will be compelled to fall back, after all, on some such statement as the apostle's, "work out your salvation, for it is God that worketh in you." Arminianism I regard as fanatical in its denial of second causes.

I'VE set myself to be a Thomist commentator. "Deus voluit hoc propter illud, sed non propter illud voluit hoc Deus," says Aquinas. The "hoc propter illud" is the subject-matter of the divine volition. God has willed, *e.g.* that the universe, with all its history, evil included, should illustrate the divine glory; "hoc propter illud." But the "illud" is not the motive cause of the "hoc." He has not directly willed the history of the universe for the sake of his glory. There is a relation of *propter*ty between the two things as the objects of divine volition. There is much

more in this distinction of Aquinas than meets the eye at first glance; though the vulgar mind will call it a distinction without a difference.*

[USES OF SPECULATION.]

WE may reverentially, and for solemn ends, speculate on the origin of evil; and these may be purely practical ends. We may hope to get *gleams* of light, fugitive rays striking downwards. It is not a bad sign of a man, but the reverse, that he continues reverentially to gaze into this question and ponder the mystery. As to the "sitting apart, holding no form of creed, but *contemplating* all," thoughtful men usually do this for a time. The end does not always justify the means; but perhaps this may be true, that though the unrest is not a good thing in itself, out of it God brings a good, and in some cases it may be the only way to the highest good. Yet we shrink from our children going into that into which we went and emerged. We fear they may not emerge.

[Is there faith in such shrinking?]

At least it is a very natural shrinking, and God does not lead us all by the same way. We have no right to suppose beforehand that others need the baptism that we were baptized with. A—— was a great man, and not the least part of this greatness was his con-

* I give the quotation as Dr. Duncan gave it. The only passage in Aquinas to which I can trace it, is the sentence in the *Summa Theologiæ*, pars prima, quæst. xix., art. 5, "Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc."

fession, "There may be many an easier way of obtaining rest than the way by which I have reached it." Discipline in philosophy is often a pathway to God, why should it be less so than any other kind of discipline? and yet its great value is in being a handmaiden, *ancilla Domini.* You might think I was caring greatly for it. But what I want is to disencumber the creed, and to christen the philosophy.

MY Theanthropology has only two texts—"God made man in his own image, in the image of God created He him;" and "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law." Therefore, *theologically*, there are only two men, Adam and Christ. What an honour has been put upon the νόμος under which Adam was, and man is, that under it also Christ should be.

I HAVE no patience with C——'s Hades. I have a hundred such speculations, all very good for myself. But I have buried them when done with them, and never unearthed them since for others. They lie in heaps in one common grave, and mother earth is on them. What does he mean by unearthing his to the gaze of men?

IN forgetting our Directory we are too little liturgical; and if the Church were very spiritual it would need no liturgy. We have far too many preaching prayers; many good ministers preach to God. The best of our forefathers were more anti-erastian than anti-epis-

copal, and more opposed to a bad liturgy than anti-liturgic. I do not wonder that the desire for forms of prayer is returning. I could say nothing against the use of a liturgy, as a catholic question, for all the churches; but I am definite against confinement to it; and as for us in Scotland, I am opposed to it in any form at present. But a good liturgy forms a fine common bond for the churches. I remember, when in Leghorn, hearing a very painful sermon from the bishop of ——; and on leaving the church a friend remarked, "I'm thankful he can't spoil the prayers."

WE cannot exhaust the significance of that sentence, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." God must be anthropomorphic, or anthropopathic in his communications. He tells us that He is infinitely unlike us; but when he is to speak to man he must do so anthropomorphically, and he has done so, even more lowlily than we ourselves need habitually conceive of him. It was in accommodation to the infancy of the world, when men spake, and thought, and understood as children—and because so many always do so in all ages. But if we are "in the image" of God, we are to Him as the shade is to the substance. It is an exceeding high mystery, but I think that the positive notion of the Infinite, which we all have, is a hint to us of that "image."

I'VE tried to discover if there be any difference between the Jansenist and the Calvinist's "ir-

resistible grace." But the Calvinists did not adopt the term "gratia irresistibilis" for themselves. Maestricht shows that it was their opponents that charged them with it; and so, says M., though it is not our term, or what we would say, we have no objection to the phrase, that gratia is irresistibilis, and yet I hold that in another sense gratia est resistibilis et resistitur. But I do not think there is any material difference between the Calvinist and Jansenist doctrine.

I THINK that both Fenelon and Leighton (the Scotch bishop) were men constitutionally afraid of the full blaze of the truth. They were naturally timorous men. They wished to possess the full truth, but they walked too *warily*, because they looked upon the truth from the sentimental rather than from its moral side.

[Is it not possible to be *too* ambitious to possess the whole truth?]

Never.

[I mean ambitious to see all its sides at once, or too speedily. May we not pay the penalty of that ambition which overleaps itself?]

Well, I like that prayer of Newman's, the subtile devout man:

> "I ask not now to see the distant view,
> One step's enough for me."

We may apply it to the search for, and the acquisition of, truth. But we must get to the centre speedily—to that *Rock* on which we may build. I fear I may not understand Lessing aright, but if I do, that saying of

his, which is so much praised,* contains the essence of all devilry. It may amount to the willingness to be eternally without God. It is the mere delight in the activity of the faculties that is chosen, the search that is fearless and free, unimpeded and irrestricted. To be left alone for ever to pursue the endless chase, cut off from the eternal Being, would be to me the horror of horrors.

[But Lessing does not wish the pursuit without reaching the goal, the chase without the prey. He only prefers the intelligent discovery of the truth to the blind reception of it.]

Well, I would add to his maxim, *Teach thou me*, else I had rather have "the truth" at once. Did the woman who lost the piece of money think the search for it better than the finding of it? "Prove all things," says the Apostle, adding, "hold fast that which is good." But, according to Lessing, we should prove all things, but hold fast nothing. It would be a loss to him to get possession of the truth. In short, Lessing's maxim is the maxim of eternal revolt and independence; and the wish to be as God contains within it a prayer for estrangement from God.

THERE are times when I cannot rest in the ethical, when I cannot find any satisfaction in historical facts. The very evangel satisfies

* "Did the Almighty, holding in his right hand *truth*, and in his left, *search after truth*, deign to proffer me the one I might prefer, in all humility, but without hesitation, I could request, *search after truth*."

me not. I cannot read my Bible, and I cannot pray. But I go out into my garden to consider the lilies how they grow. μὴ μεριμνᾶτε, they seem to preach :—Carking care, away!

OUR systems of theology are a bondage, and must be a bondage till they are adopted on rational conviction. And yet very often these very dogmas are cheerfully adopted by those who once rent them asunder as fetters. Systematic truth is systematic error to me, if I ignorantly and unconvincedly bind myself to it; and all *real* fetters should always be broken. But earnest and good men usually come to see that what they once found to be fetters, are the cords and bands of a man—the girders of his strength. It is a monstrous thing that that horrible word "heresy" is now used on all occasions so freely, and applied so recklessly to *all error.* All error is not heresy. Amesius, in his book, *De Conscientia,* starts the question, "an Arminianismus heresis sit?" But people *will* use this word, and scatter firebrands, arrows, and death, as recklessly as if they were in sport. Heresy is a work of the *flesh,* and no man can be charged with it, even on a fundamental, till, after faithful admonishment, he persists in it, *knowing* that he does so. No man can be deposed from the church catholic for doctrinal heresy. He may be suspended from this or that individual church, but not cut off from the universal church of Christ. For, note, —"Who can understand his errors?" And it is too often forgotten that no man can be charged

with an opinion which is only the valid *consequence* of the doctrines he holds, if that consequence is by him disowned. You cannot deal judicially with a man for a logical blunder, though you may deem him intellectually weak or confused. There is no *indefectible* connection between the theoretical and the practical, nor between an axiom and its sequences. I mean that though the one may entail the other, a man is not to be held chargeable with both, if he explicitly disowns either.

I OFTEN think that our church errs in taking it for granted (indirectly at least) that the fervour and life that characterised the beginning of its history will remain with it, without experiencing an ebb of the tide. There are tides in all things; and the great wave of Divine Blessing seems to keep ebbing and flowing amongst the churches. But that is a fine saying of Sack of Bonn, in his *History of the Scottish Church*—"In Scotland there are no sects, only *parties*." That is a fine testimony from a foreigner. Sometimes you see most truly from a distance. He meant we should not dignify our differences by the name of "sects;" we are only parties in one great sect—the species of a genus.

AUGUSTINE was greater on the whole than Calvin. Calvin is the more complete; no thanks to him for that, for Calvin was standing on Augustine's shoulders, Augustine on his own feet. In Calvin you see great amplitude of mind, and great common-sense clearness; far

less metaphysical profundity, and far less of the subdued Platonic fervour which you find in Augustine. I think of the two men together as "the pigmy on the giant's back;" though Calvin after all was no pigmy.

SATAN. It is a strange thing that so fine a spirit is let loose to do so much mischief, but he is only "the prince of the power of the air," not of the power of the spirit. I believe there may be more devils than men. They are legion, and go in companies, so far as we can gather from the hints of Scripture. I think each temptation that assails a man may be from a separate devil. And they are not far off; probably our atmosphere was the place of their original banishment. And there they live,—air-princes. But mark, they have no power over the innermost *spirit;* nay, they can have no knowledge of the secrets of the heart of man. No single heart-secret is known to any single devil. These are known only to the Searcher of the hearts, who is also their Maker. Some good Christians disquiet themselves by forgetting this. I would say that our adversary can look and hear, see and listen, and make inferences. He has only a phenomenal knowledge, and that not perfect. He is but a creature, and cannot know the secrets of the universe. It ought to comfort all men that only our Maker knows our constitution. . . .

GHOSTS. But what do you think of ghosts? For my part, I neither believe nor do I

disbelieve in them. A man essaying to demonstrate their impossibility gives evidence of possessing an awfully phenomenal mind (which thing is my abhorrence. *I abhor a mere phenomenalist*). The credulous and facile mind may believe almost anything as to the supernatural; but the incredulous and merely critical mind is often as crass and stolid as the other. Now, why should ghosts not exist *à priori?* There is no reason against them. If Providence is, they may be. They may belong to the unseen cosmical system, or to a part of it. As to the facts *à posteriori*, each one must satisfy himself.

[He told some remarkable ghost-stories.]

ANGELS. I believe it is mercy that our eyes are shut to save us from angel worship; for I so believe in the ministry of angels, that I do not know but if I saw them I might be led to give them homage. The distinctions between *latria* and *doulia* might then appear. And if in the upper world we shall see the "angel that came and ministered unto Him," I think the whole church will be greatly interested in that angel. We must beware, in this matter of the intervention of angels, of two extremes—of a vulgar credulity and a presumptive incredulity. We live in an age in which we should say it *may* be so, and neither it *must* be so, nor it *cannot* be so. I'm fond of the caveats. Why should they not be delegated to interfere? Some subordinate agents between God and man there surely are. And if there be a hierarchy rising upwards to the throne, and

Him who sits on it, may not the angels be often sent to minister to those on the earth who need their succour? My homage to the supernatural would lead me to believe in angels, even though I had no revelation on the subject; and every suggestion of the unseen is precious, every door opening into it. And ah! Protestant as I am, even image-worship does appeal to a part of man's nature. There is an old stone of granite by the roadside, as you wind up the hill at old Buda, upon which a worn and defaced image of our Saviour is cut, which I used often to pass. Below the granite block are the words—"O vos omnes qui transitis per viam, attendite et videte si est ullus dolor sicut dolor meus." The thorough woe-begoneness of that image used to haunt me long: that old bit of granite—the beau-ideal of human sorrow, weakness, and woe-begoneness. To this day it will come back upon me, and always with that dumb gaze of perfect calmness—no complaining—the picture of meek and mute suffering. The memory of it comes up fresh as when I first looked upon it; and yet it is a purely human feeling, it is not spiritual.

[Why condemn the emotion? It is only the homage that is to be restrained.]

I can only say I'm a Protestant, and dislike image-worship, yet never can I get that statue out of my mind. So, too, when in Italy I saw the crucifixes by the roadsides, I felt they were not Protestant; but I could never pass them without a very tender reminiscence. By the way, the Romish devotee

is wrong only in going to the wrong priest: and both the traveller, and the vicar to whom he travels, have very bad optics.

I BELIEVE that the school of theology, towards which many fresh minds are apt to drift, is near of kin to that which they would very much wish to shun,—to wit, the harshness of Bradwardine. In Bradwardine and Twisse, the lawyer threatens to swallow up the ethicist, as conversely, in Mr. Maurice's system, the ethicist devours the lawyer. In Jonathan Edwards and the New Englanders we have a fine union of moral law and moral ethic. Holiness and justice are respectively the æsthetic and the moral elements of law; and, with all his rigour, Edwards is supremely moral. Yet he was not fully cognisant (though not wholly unaware) that he held within his system a species of very high and refined internal pantheism. In a hypertheistic system sin must equally vanish as in the atheistic; and Edwards has in other treatises unconsciously developed this internal pantheism more fully. I have never entered the door of either supra- or infra-lapsarian Calvinism. But Maurice's system is pure illegality. It will never go down with the lawyers; it upsets their science entirely. Bare ethic, without law, is the ethic of Jehovah alone, and his coequals, living together in the one tie of ἀγάπη, where there are no *subjects.* This ἀγάπη might be the bond of union on Olympus amongst co-equal gods, were polytheism true; (though it was not even so much as imagined on the

ancient Olympus). But whenever subjects appear beneath the sovereign, *obligation* enters. I can understand the fact I have heard, that Sir W. Hamilton disliked the theology of Maurice. He was an advocate. No lawyer is likely to fall into a sentimentalism about law. It's a serious matter to be under law and to be at the bar, and to feel the solemn rigour of jurisprudence. And the end of punishment is not, I think, primarily to reform the punished, but to vindicate the law.

[But is not such a vindication blank, if the final end of it is not the reclamation of the transgressor?]

Not necessarily; but the reclamation is also attempted, it is also provided for. Goethe said once, all the course of Providence goes to show that the God of Providence is the same as the severe Jehovah of the Hebrews. . . .

PAUL'S Christianity, and his anti-christianity, had a common principle lying at their root —viz. "the law is good;" and I do not find in Paul the least affinity with that system which would merge law in ethics. He never set himself up as the equal of his Maker. But this is the natural upshot of the sentimental system lately revived in England. The law of fealty, the law which says "thou shalt," does not exist for the Supreme himself. Duty (*qua moral*) is for the creature and Creator alike; and in this we oppose Mr. Mansel out and out; but (*qua law*), it is for the creature only. I do not charge Mr. Maurice with all the conse-

quences of his system, but I proclaim these consequences. A man may veer far from the centre, and yet his error never ripen into a heresy; and his heresy (if it be one) has not yet founded a sect. If it does found a sect, in time the doctrine will be seen to develop its full issues; as a half-truth generally ripens into a manifest lie, and then, at its full development, the sect is near its death.

I HAVE certainly more of the Pauline Epistles than of the four Gospels in my nature, though the latter are our foundation. Paul was from first to last a man of *law;* and the Pauline relations of law and gospel have taken a very deep hold of me. Paul, too, has more variety than any of the Apostles. He has his own distinctive features, and he has a good deal of the Johanean and the Petrine besides. And honest James was like one of the old prophets risen again. He reads just like a prophet. "The tongue is a fire, a world of iniquity." "Can the fig-tree, my brethren, bear olive-berries, or the vine figs?" "Go to, now, ye rich men, weep for your miseries," etc. etc. He had to write in the same strain to "the twelve tribes scattered abroad," as Joel and the rest of old. The Jews had not improved much. They are strange people. I have often pitied Moses, for he had a stiff rebellious race to manage. . . . Yet I feel that I, with many others, have been disproportionately Pauline. These Epistles presuppose the Gospels (having been sent to those churches that possessed the

materials of the latter). Hence, though, for the balancing of truth, there is nothing like the Pauline letters; for vitality and freshness, there is nothing like the facts of the Gospel; and were I a younger man, and to begin my studies again, the four Gospels would bulk more prominently in my attention than they have done. The bearing of the life, death, and teaching of Christ, on the whole economy of God's government,—that is the Pauline sphere. With his own nature rooted in Christ, Paul surveys the relations which *He* bears to the universe. John, again, with the eagle eye, is content to gaze, and to rest gazing, on "the light, which is the life of men." John was an intense intuitionalist. His Gospel and first Epistle, taken together, make a good apologetical manual. His Epistle gives the philosophy of the Gospel.

I'VE sometimes thought that God's greatest power is best seen in the most silent awakenings of the spirit of man. So it is in natural things; the daily course of the earth, silent and sure, with no jolt, or start forwards; so in all our vital acts. God acts in all of these directly. If our vital acts were in our own power, we should not live a moment;—why should it be otherwise in the spiritual sphere, where the soul often awakens quietly at the touch of God? Let us never imagine that tumultuous changes, stormy upheavals of the will, reveal His presence more markedly than the gentle whispers of His voice. He is not far from any one of us, for ἐν αὐτῷ ἐσμέν.

[Augustine's Theory of Evil.]

I DO not say it is altogether made out, but it is *maxime probabile*. *I* believe it, and I believe it is essential to Augustinianism, *i.e.* Augustinianism falls, if it falls. Yet I won't make it an article of the common faith, or place it in the creed. It is so high a theologoumenon. God's will is not bound up by the causal nexus, *i.e.* His will *qua* will; as *moral* it is necessarily holy. But I am keenly anti-Edwardean in his assertions as to will in general (including *therefore* the Divine). I am even Pelagian in reference to the Divine will, *qua will:* at least I am purely libertarian. As to sin, I am, and must remain, an Augustinian. Yet when I speculate long upon it, my head reels in mental vertigo. Sin is not a positive entity.

[It is nothing noumenal or substantial, else it would be a creature. It is phenomenal only.]

It is less than nothing, infinitely less than nothing, the algebraical >. I can realise it to myself only by faint analogies. Death is not a positive thing. It is the absence of life. Dark is the withdrawal of light, cold the absence of heat, rest the cessation of movement. They are disparates, and there are analogous disparates; though, I admit, faint adumbrations. Yet sin, as I have said, is a cancer, which, if it could spread unchecked, would eat up all being, and dethrone God himself.

[Would you say that as it is only the vital force within the human frame that preserves it from decay, by perpetually replenishing it with new

material,—so it is the life of God within the universe that preserves it from that defection which constitutes sin?]

Undoubtedly it is God's upholding that preserves us from sin. It is what I call the chemistry of life that keeps us out of the range of the chemistry of death. So it is a communicated "gratia" that keeps us out of the range of the "delapsus." If God withdraws this (which He is not obligated to retain), we fall "de." We experience the "*want* of original righteousness." This want is clearly privative. But the other term made use of by our Westminster divines—viz. the "corruption of the whole nature,"—is not so easily seen to be merely privative. But it may denote the new chemistry which supervenes at death, and destroys the body, which supervention is due to the prior and clearly privative fall. Yet we must remember that a dead animal is not the same as dead unorganised matter. . . . Do not the majority of ethical writers ignore the fall? I do not say deny it, but ignore it? Plato did not; for he, in striving after the *καλοκἀγαθόν*, felt that he was *once*, in some pre-existent state, what he wished to be in this life. And so all noble Platonists feel that—

> "Trailing clouds of glory do we come,
> From God who is our home."

Plato had a glimmering of the *jenseits*.

HELL is no blot in God's universe.

[Is that not just the optimist doctrine which you neither affirm nor deny?]

No: I do not say this is the best of all *possible* universes. I *cannot* know that for certain. But I say that there is no blot in *this* universe, so far as God is concerned.

[But if there is a blot at all, must not God be concerned with it in some way, if he is the creator of the creature who has made the blot?]

That he is concerned with evil, I deny not. He has proved his concern with it, both by his law, by its punishment, and his intervention to deliver from it. But He has not allowed his universe to be blighted. Sin and death are monstrous anomalies. It was never intended that we should either die or sin. And that the spirit and the body should separate, or the soul separate from God, is only tolerated for the sake of a reunion, through the grander union of the Theanthropos with man.

[After a long conversation on this mystery]—

Ah! think now of the infinite God looking down all this time on our babblings in the dark.

I SUPPOSE there are few pious Deists. I presume there are some, but few. Lord Herbert of Cherbury was certainly pious after a sense. But you see men cannot *love* a God that is misunderstood. Spinoza was a pious man, so was Novalis. But a God that is misconceived is not likely to be often in "all a man's thoughts." There are minds to whom, though they are atheists, the problem of being

is interesting for evermore, and draws them into this attitude of reverent pondering. Throughout the three years of my experience of it, I was for ever theologising on my atheism. What are we? where are we? whence, and whitherwards? and for what end are we here? what is the hour on the clock of the universe? and so forth. Human life, death, and destiny, are for ever interesting to the atheist who *thinks*. There are some minds in the Christian church who are theoretical theists but practical atheists. It is an awful thing that practical atheism, "without God in the world." It is worse than theoretical error; and I have known theoretical atheists (pantheists at least), who were believers in God at heart. Let us not judge persons.

POSTULATE God (let the belief be gained as you will, only gained), then *creation*, in the strict sense of the term, must follow. I do not mean that God is under a necessity to create, but that what exists must be his creation. For, if not, then I can conceive a more perfect being than God—to wit, such a creator ex nihilo. But God is, by hypothesis, the most perfect, the all perfect; therefore this perfection of creation is his.

[This is just reading out analytically the contents of your postulate, for in assuming God you assume infinite perfection.]

Yes, but it is well that we analyse the postulate thus. He is more perfect than we can conceive. We can conceive this, and this is a perfection, therefore, *à fortiori*, is this perfection his.

And the power to create an atom is a far mightier perfection than indefinite arrangements of design in the created matter of an indefinitely great universe.

[But creation is not ex nihilo into existence; for is it not, to our conception only, but also really true, ex nihilo nihil?]

Yes, the *materies rei* can never be produced or summoned out of the vacuum of the *nihil.* I own we cannot conceive creation.

[And when we *try* to think it, our thought immediately glides into the notion of evolution or emanation—the invisible becoming visible, as vapour condensing in a cloud.]

Still we *must* believe in that which transcends conception, or we cannot be theists.

[Is the doctrine of an eternal materia prima, *necessarily*, I mean logically, destructive of theism?]

I consider it to be so; though I know some theists hold it contradictorily, as they think, to escape a greater contradiction. But I see no refuge from pantheism, but in a doctrine of creation ex nihilo. I admit that after creation has taken place, we may have only the record of evolution in things material, not in things spiritual.

I REPUDIATE Mansel's doctrine of our ignorance of God. It is deadly, both in morals and religion. If I have no knowledge of the Infinite, *qua moral,* if there be not a relation between us (man's moral nature the typal, God's moral nature the archetypal), how can there be

any intercourse between God and man? There could be no communion where there was no community of nature. But I go further; I say that in the *moral* region it is not the typal and the archetypal (it is so in the intellectual), but it is *identity*—not a pantheistic uniformity, nevertheless an *identity of nature.*

CARLYLE. I am no worshipper of Force. I see nothing to admire in mere power, *i.e.* in its quantity apart from its quality. Carlyle's earnestness is very touching and noble; but it seems to me that, according to his teaching, if you could conceive an omnipotent devil, you ought to worship him as much as Israel's Jehovah.

[So that he is in one sense a modern Manichee?]

I suspect so. And an omnipotent militia of darkness would be the very horror of horrors. . . The connection between Carlylism and despotism I see, but the link is nowhere explicitly avowed. Carlyle is sometimes difficult to understand, and very difficult to *judge.* Why did he call Chalmers the last of the Christians? I suppose he forgets what he has written elsewhere. Hero-worship! ah well, he and I have to meet a strange hero yet—*Θάνατος*—the greatest that I know of next to Him who overcame him. Carlyle has great faith in the devil, but I suspect he always appreciates quantity of being and of power more than quality. . . . . Have you observed how Christianity takes up the fragmentary truth that lies in the demono-

logical and the spirit-inhabited? We Christians have lost nothing that *could* be retained in the old mythologies. And *perhaps* these beliefs in spiritual presences in nature are but the lingering mist of patriarchal tradition concerning the spirit-world.

IT IS a strange thing that is going on in our day, the rise of Christian communities outside the Christian Church. What their Christianity may consist of we do not exactly know. The Chinese rebels, for example: they all accept the Scriptures, they receive the ten commandments, and are iconoclasts. But it is most difficult to get accurate information regarding them. And the Indian mind has been wonderfully stirred since the days of Rammohun Roy. His "Precepts of Jesus" was a great gift to India, a fine basis. But I wish he had advanced from these, as the first disciples did. The providence of God is bringing Western Asia into prominence just now (1859). We do not know what new pathways are to be opened up for His truth. And I have great interest in the future of Russia. I think there may be a magnificent career yet before that people. Their Peter was a great man, slightly mad; a magnificent savage, still a savage. He was a noble fellow to go as a workman amongst the wild carles. But had it not been for that Genevese Lefort, he might have gone on like one of the old Czars before him. Lefort put into his mind the notion of visiting Western Europe. A despotism would be the very perfection of government, if we could get so good a sovereign

always that his simple will might be absolute law. But this is impossible, and the next best thing is what we have in England—limited constitutional monarchy. The autocrat should be the best originator. In the theocracy of the Jews we have the germ of a despotism under the law of liberty. But it was too perfect for corrupt humanity, and the πολιτεία of the New Testament is better than it, though the spirit of the theocracy cannot die.

[ON SOME POETS, ETC.]

WORDSWORTH is very grand at times. He is a better Platonist than many of the philosophers. But I cannot worship Nature as he does.

[It is Nature's spirit he worships, the Universe as "haunted for ever by the Eternal Mind."]

But what do you make of these lines?—

> "One impulse from a vernal wood
> Will teach you more of man,
> Of moral evil and of good,
> Than all the sages can."

That's not true. He had not read many folios. "A vernal wood" may steep you in sentiment, and make you cease from thinking at all, but it can't *teach* you in my sense of the word. I daresay he saw those "humanities" in the wood that he had *put into it*. But I don't see how he could extract them, if he had not put them in. Yet I suppose he only wished to make a truth emphatic by contrast; and we must not forget the saying, "Consider the lilies how

they grow." But what do you think of Coleridge? To me, when I cannot follow him, there is always a fine ring, like bell-chimes, in his melody; not unlike our best nursery rhymes, for it is curious the fine cadences we get in the nursery. I like Coleridge's "Kubla Khan" for its exquisite cadence. That whole passage beginning—

> "In Xanadu did Kubla Khan
> A stately pleasure-dome decree:
> Where Alph, the sacred river, ran
> Through caverns measureless to man,
> Down to a sunless sea"—

has a most fascinating melody. I don't know what it means, but it's very fine. In Southey, too, you meet with flights of fine wild melody, though it is rather rhythmical prose than poetry that Southey has written. Much poetry only amounts to rhetorical prose, as much prose is non-versified poetry. The conterminous limits are difficult to adjust; but we must add a third region to that of simple prose and poetry. Tennyson sometimes comes nearer to Shakespeare than any of our moderns. . . . . Sir Philip Sidney is a writer too little known. His "Defence of Poesy" is one of the finest pieces of prose we have—rich as Milton's, with more precision. And Milton's prose is as much worth study as his poetry—sturdy strength, with a grand roll about it. Milton, Sir T. Browne, Hooker, and Taylor, are each great writers of various types. The Elizabethan English is largely founded on the Italian of the sixteenth century (the Decameron was a

good deal read at that time in England); and in it you have neither the purity of the Old Saxon nor the baldness of the Anglo-Saxon. Hobbes founded his excellently terse style, to a great degree, upon the Italian of the sixteenth century. The English is really a most noble language, capable of expressing almost anything, if men only knew its capabilities and the secret of its strength and beauty. But I do not like all the stock models of English. Dr. Adam Clark is one of the best masters of English prose—in this respect, that his style is the most perfect blending of the Saxon and the Latin that I know of. It is neither Swiftean nor Defoean in its Saxon, nor Johnsonian in its Latinity. You never feel that either element is in the least too prominent, or at all defective. And I like old Herbert's prose. That "Country Parson" of his is a fine piece of writing. Carlyle, too, when he keeps to genuine English, when his historical narrative (as in some parts of his "French Revolution") is vigorously sustained, has done a great deal to display the capabilities of English prose. But he often writes sheer gibberish, according to the classical tests. And whenever a man becomes cloudy in his words, be sure that his thought has grown shadowy too. . . . . I am fond of the French writers for their clearness. They are not always, or often, profound; but you always know what they mean. You see to the bottom of the well. French literature has not originated much, but it is admirable as a means of popularisation, and

good as a vehicle for humour. Voltaire is perhaps the greatest master of wit that ever lived. His style, too, is the finest in French literature. He grounded it, I think, on Pascal's, who wrote most noble French. Voltaire's comedy of Nanine I like much. It is sentimental, but thoroughly good. Jean Jacques is poor compared with him. Rousseau strained after show and effect. . . . As to writing, in this age of magniloquence I would advise every one to be very careful to use no more words than are necessary to express thought. Aim at the Aristotelic. Some men seem desirous of adumbrating their thoughts by their words. They inoculate their thought, and often with a virus. Some writers—word-fanciers—seem first to have secured a good stock of terms, if with the "curiosa felicitas," so much the better; and then they consider how they may best fit them into a sentence! But the result is like that of a word-fancier's essay I once read, and a friend asked, "Is it not deep?" I answered, "Not deep, but drumlie." Now the drumlie often looks very deep. . . . I always recommend Aristotle for his clearness. There is no writer like him for using no more words than he had thoughts. He is the very model of the precise and the full together. The Schoolmen lost this. Aquinas is far behind his "Philosophus" in this. But he is much subtiler. Subtility is the main feature of scholasticism.

[Read Aquinas's Hymn on the Eucharist.]

"Sumunt boni, sumunt mali."

They do no such thing. This doctrine is my abhorrence. There is an eternal difference. The latter take only the shell, and miss the kernel.

[Aquinas means no more, for he adds—

"Sorte tamen inæquali,
Vitæ vel interritus."]

But the "sumere" is not applicable to the "mali." I cannot concede that. And so—

"Ecce panis angelorum,
Factus cibus viatorum,
Vere panis filiorum!"

It is *not* angels' food. They never tasted it. It is ours. And if you minish that truth, you may eviscerate half the significance of redemption. "He took not on Him the nature of angels," but our nature, and *therefore* this food is ours.

THE person of Christ is not sufficiently studied or contemplated by the majority of modern theologians. Very many Protestants are Nestorian without knowing it. It is not so with the Catholics. You will never find a Roman priest wandering from the Catholic faith on the person of Christ, or in reference to the Trinity.

[How do you account for that?]

It is probably because the idler Protestants have engrossed themselves with the one doc-

trine of justification, and made it bulk too largely, forgetting its foundation. There are fundamentals beneath justification. The person of Christ is fundamental. Justification, and all else connected with it, is grounded on moral law. Sin had been committed, and satisfaction must be made, made in the nature that had sinned, and the sinning must be the suffering nature too. Therefore Christ became man; but as atonement by man was impossible, and by the created nature impossible, it was made by the God-man. Now, justification by faith is the meeting point of many doctrines, a rallying centre of theology; but it is not the foundation doctrine. The Reformers are not to blame for this inattention to the person of Christ; they were fuller than the majority of their successors. Nor are the Protestant Schoolmen, either of Geneva or of Holland, to blame. It must have crept in in an unlearned age, when the doctrine of justification began to be looked upon as a radical and special doctrine rather than as a meeting point and centre of other doctrines. It is true that scarcely any of us in Scotland give due prominence to the Incarnation.

APOLLOS (ἀνὴρ λογικὸς, not eloquent, but an *intellectual* man, a ratiocinative thinker, somewhat of the type of Philo-Judæus) closely resembled Paul, whose principal aim as a writer seems to be to unfold the whole unity of the Divine plan. Isaiah I take to be the most Pauline of the Old Testament men; Ezekiel the most Petrine; and, diverse as they are in

many respects, I know no man more Johannean than Moses. His meekness is closely allied to the Johannean love.

WHAT is our warrant for preaching from *texts?* or for the excessive amount of doctrinal preaching that abounds? There was little doctrinal preaching till the heresies came. Before that the disciples came together, and read, and prayed, and exhorted one another. Their words were hortatory, not doctrinal. They read the Scriptures, and said, "Let's be Christians," and partook of the Sacrament, and sang, and went home. A modern Glassite meeting-house is, after all, the nearest approach to the primitive style of worship. I don't say it is therefore the best; for times change—God changes them; and we must change with them. And as the heresies exist, doctrinal teaching is a necessity. But we have too much of it in our pulpits: doctrinal *preaching* is one thing, doctrinal *teaching* is another. . . . . I insist very strongly on Christian teaching in the *household*, and on the necessity of stated family worship. We are Romish if we substitute the church service for the altar at home. If the call to religious meetings is made more important than the call to daily household prayer, in what does it differ from the call to matins and vespers? but we might have a more varied domestic service, as well as a fuller church service. Hymnologies are of great use; but we should have a better selection of hymns. We might have portions of Scripture translated

into verse besides the Psalms, keeping as faithfully to the original as the Psalms do. But what I would prefer would be *the singing of prose.* For example—"We have a strong city. Salvation hath God appointed for walls and bulwarks." What a fine passage to be sung! If I were musical, I could almost improvise on that. Handel would have done it. In Rome they have plenty of singing; they sing in their very pilgrimages.

[Did you hear the Sistine music at Rome?]

No, and I would not care to hear it, for they are neither men, women, nor children that sing it. . . . Our Scotch collection of paraphrases is not good as a whole, nor are they bad as a whole. A few men (none of them poets) merely recast the old paraphrastic hymns of Wesley, Watts, and Doddridge, and the result is our "paraphrases." They are often too classical, often commonplace, and some are both ultra-classical *and* commonplace. The two best hymns in Christendom, in my opinion, are the Te Deum and the Veni Creator Spiritus.

IT'S exceedingly foolish, but exceedingly common, for men to put the *ἀδιάφορα* into the place of the *essentialia.* For example, I am a strong pædobaptist; but I favour immersion in theory; and if I built churches, I would build for immersion. But it is an adiaphoron. It is strange that you so often find good theologians straining at a gnat, and swallowing camels. So, too, standing when singing is the best attitude. Musical men say it is the best

posture for the voice; and I say it is the most reverential attitude for the worshipper. So is kneeling at prayer. But our churches are not built for it. That is, on the whole, a pity; but it is altogether an adiaphoron.

[NATURAL THEOLOGY, ETC.]

MANSEL. We and the Rationalists together must fall on him. He makes religion irrational. Now, I believe in reason, and respect it as the creature of God, and a ladder which leads to him, though I am doubtful of the philosophies.

[That is, you believe in it as an organon, but not as a revelation; as an eye, but not as a light?]

It is certainly more of an instrument of discovery, than a discoverer. At least I do not think it has discovered much. It is of use to show its own impotence, and of use to welcome a revelation.

[In order to welcome it, it must be itself a light. Is it not the lesser light which rules the night, and revelation the greater which rules the day?]

All light is from the Father of Lights.

[But are not reason and faith two separate powers of apprehension, by which we lay hold of the object appealing to them, as in that symbol of the brother and sister, one blind and the other deaf, each deprived of a sense, but each aiding the other by the sense it possesses?]

They are not equally balanced powers. I think faith has the start of reason from

the first. But what I maintain as to reason is, that though it is a power, it is a barren power, which can produce nothing till revelation descends to meet it. Its efforts in the construction of philosophies (much as I value it) are, I think, *nil*. It's not philosophy I reject, it's the pile of speculations. Is a philosophy of the universe competent to man? that's always the question with me. If it is, *it hasn't yet been*. I still discover that there is a great deal of the philosophical sceptic in me.

[But you have admitted the validity of the Scotch philosophy of common-sense.]

I concur in the main with Reid and Stewart, in the results of their common-sense philosophy, but *not philosophically*. I believe in axioms (including the mathematical and logical laws); in the Senses, which report to me the external world; in Objectivity (including the existence of other minds besides my own); in Testimony (and under this I rank the evidences of a historical Revelation); and in the syllogistic nexus; and besides these I don't know that I believe in anything else. Common sense I believe in, but not in a philosophy of common sense.

[Where, then, do you place the theistic faith? You have not a category of intuitions.]

The belief in God presses multifariously upon man. It is not wise to say, "This is its origin;" or "No, that is its origin." It is not—Lo! here; or, lo! there. It is everywhere.

[But what is its *root*?]

It is an instinct. I believe man was made

in the image of God, and that he still retains part of that image, it being indestructible. There is a knowledge of God which all men have, and a knowledge of Him which is only possible to the καινὴ κτίσις. But on the "natural theologies" I'm always inclined to look with a measure of suspicion. I agree with their truths, but not with their method of probation. There is a hole in it *somewhere.* Does not Mansel do the very reverse? He is doubtful of that which is reached, but not dissatisfied with the method of proof.

[But you cannot be a philosophical sceptic, and save theology; will not Sextus be able to disturb the axiom, "man is man in the image of God," if you overthrow all philosophy, and do not admit an apprehensive intuition of God?]

I cannot reach that by philosophy which God gives by inspiration. Faith in himself seems to be due to a χρίσμα τοῦ Ἁγίου; and, if "the anointing which we have received of Him abideth in us, we need not that any man teach us." I often fear that if we do not concede enough to the operation of the Holy Spirit in this matter, we will not do much for psychology either. The attempt to make too much of logical deductions is just ultimately to make too little of them. And as for a logical proof of the Divine existence, I am convinced that when the faith is more than parrotism and traditionalism, the Spirit of God has had more to do with it than some orthodox divines are willing to admit. And if so, there must be some terrible falsity in that which says that all conviction must be due to demonstration.

[But you do admit an intuition of the Infinite?]

Well, I affirm that reason overleaps itself; that is the best phrase we can get for it. But our intuition or intuitive knowledge of God cannot be defined. You need not ask me to tell you what it is, for I tell you I cannot, and that no man can.

[An explanation could only be given by the logical faculty, the faculty of definitions, and you cannot explain ultimates. But logic can clear away mists, and clarify our intuitions.]

Yes; but it gives us riddle upon riddle, most puzzling antinomies. I contend for a notion of the Infinite, positivo-negative let us call it. If mankind had not a notion of the infinite, they could not talk of it either affirmatively or negatively. I do not suppose that Sir William would have denied me these two things—that you cannot get quit of the *idea* of the infinite, and that you cannot get quit of the idea *that it is.*

[If it be a mere notion or idea, we may carry the notion with us as part of our permanent mental furniture, without any guarantee that it has a counterpart beyond us. It needs an intuition to carry you out into the domain of the objective.]

Well, I think that escape from the prison-house of the Ego is due to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. You see I fall back on the χρίσμα τοῦ Ἁγίου. And note, in reference to the knowledge of God, that you must not predicate of the abstracts what is predicable only

of, the concretes. For example, it is true of infinity and finity that the one contradicts the other, but not of the Infinite and the finite. But don't you feel that in almost all our philosophies we put the concrete fact into the alembic, and instead of getting the essence, we only get the *caput mortuum?* In instance, ask Jonathan Edwards, "What is virtue?" and he answers you, "The love of universal being." Now, Edwards was not a mere speculator, but that sentence of his is the *caput mortuum* of "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and all thy soul, and mind, and strength." And I think you get the essence by *faith.*

[Or by devotion.]

Well, you are taught it in the near Presence. . . . . And so philosophy seems to me to be a necessity, and the philosophies to be failures.

[You honour the process, but reject the product?]

I honour the process, and greatly honour the producers. And as to the product, moderated sceptic though I am, I value Aristotle for his clearness, and Plato for his depth. And the science of Logic has a most noble aim. It is a majestic problem to give the shape to all thinking, without the thinking itself: and in this, in comparison with what Aristotle has left, very little has been added: Yet Aristotle no doubt made partial use of an antecedent logic. . . . As to our knowledge of matter, I always fluctuate between these two positions—whether the mind in perception has a direct knowledge

of the qualities, or only a sensation with an accompanying belief in the object. Both systems give me objectivity. And there is a truth in Berkeley's system, which I do not think Reid saw. He is right in the main against Berkeley; but there may be a very vulgar Reidism. Reid is right against a certain Berkeleyism, and Berkeley is right against a certain type of Reidism. I was for a long time under the fascination of the Bishop of Cloyne. But I found that the narrative of the six days' creation, if I accepted it as in any sense historical, gave my Berkeleyism a stab. Before man appeared upon the scene, the world did not exist in his thought; and before the world was, how could it exist in the Divine thought?

[Berkeley would say, that is just what he contends for. It didn't then exist. Thought preceded its existence, and its existence is dependent on thought.]

That I do not deny, but I do not think it is inconsistent with what I also affirm, that the existence of creation before man appeared proves that the world of matter is independent of *his* thought; and if there was a time when matter was *created*, it seems *then* to have passed out of the subjective into the objective. But I think that Berkeley's was a profounder as well as a subtiler mind than Reid's, and after all Hume gives me a deeper analysis than Reid. I abhor the Humist philosophy, but Hume goes beneath the can't-help-myself-ism of Reid. He is sceptical of Reid's dogma. Why cannot I help myself? And I do not see that Sir William's

doctrine of immediate perception helps me to get rid of my scepticism. I must get hold of an absolute or universal truth, and the objectivity that I reach through the immediate perception of matter may be true for me, but may be no more. It may have no universal validity. What I desiderate is a truth which I shall know to be absolutely universal.

[But *all* knowledge is relative to the knower, and its character must differ with the characteristics of the knower?]

Nay; that this table is a trapezium is not true to my mind and false to yours, or possibly false to my mind. It is true for all mind throughout the universe. *I would despise humanity, were it not so.*

[But you have gone up to the region of mathematical axiom.]

Well, I want to know if these hold good for every mind in the universe; and I want to know the same in reference to the faiths I live by, for I must despise humanity if it is not so; and I say that I can only find this if I am made in the image of God.

[But that fact transcends experience. By what ladder do you reach it?]

You may say it's a flight. But I think experience suggests it, when it is communicated with by Revelation. And Plato was on the track of this truth in his archetypal ideas. My mind tends that way. I cannot tell you whence this conviction comes, but I have reached it. I do not know that its origin *can* be told.

[Is it not partly through the innate notion of God which survives, and partly by the tradition of time, and partly by immediate inspiration?]

But you bring in again the philosophy which I cast out.

[I appeal to intuition, to testimony, and to that χρῖσμα τοῦ 'Αγίου.]

I do not know anything of its ultimate rationale; but I have sufficient evidence for it, and it is the starting point with me.

[But we are in search of a principle, deeper than Reid's, valid for every mind.]

If I am made in the image of God, my nature has a universal element in it. And yet, I think, if the mind dwells long on the intimacy of God with the soul, as made in his image, and still more as re-made in the image of Christ, it is very near to a practical pantheism; and if it dwells over long on the thought of its distance from the infinite as a creature, it is not far from the verge of a practical atheism. And it is a great matter to correct ultras by combinations. In Eden, I suppose, there would be the closest sense of intimacy, with the greatest sense of distance. . . . The greatest of the antinomies is between the finite and the infinite, but you cannot say they contradict each other, since they are relatives. But how much more satisfactory is it, in this high region, to get a text from one of those men who saw less through a glass than we do! Well, Paul told the Athenians, 'Εν αὐτῷ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν. Mark the force of that ἐν αὐτῷ; the finite is within the infinite, and

Paul was not long of reminding them of their own happy guess, "we are his offspring." Now take this, and come down with it to the sphere of reason, and it casts a light upon those questions with which otherwise we are baffled. Although I don't think you can get up by means of reason, yet when you come down with the lamp of faith into the sphere of reason, you perceive some truths that you saw not before. Now the image of God in man is such an image as fits man for communion with God, mind with mind; for two minds (or one mind and a million) can act and react upon each other directly. When one human mind acts upon another, is it not the activity of the one that stirs the activity of the other?

TRUE concession is not only the strength of polemic, but a positive accession to truth. Controversialists should always begin by concession. It is courteous, and therefore conciliates. There is sometimes a razor-like sharpness between truth and error; sometimes they shade into each other; and the truth often lies in the *via media* between opposite errors. When I cannot find out the medium, I always try to find the two extremes. The mere controversialist, who would always be in the thick of the fight with error, is no more worthy of respect than the pugilist. The controversial minds are like the lean cattle of Egypt; they are very greedy, and are none the fatter for their feeding.

I SUSPECT that, after all, there is only one heresy, and that is Antinomianism. It is

one thing to contemplate the relations of a subject under law, and another to be under law as a subject. Æsthetical religion seems always disposed to kick at the curse of the law, and the theologians in whom the sentimental has extinguished the jurisprudential, have not fully understood the nature of sin. I don't think that Maurice properly acknowledges sin; it is only vitiosity. I take it, too, that men of his cast of mind will be averse to, but would be greatly the better of, the material expressions of Scripture. The mind which has a bias towards the ideal side, is itself not in harmony with the biblical concrete; which we should, in all cases, frequently consult, or we will be working away at the production of internal distilled essences. And I cannot help thinking that there is much unholy philanthropy in that type of the theological mind. You find it in a very noble man, John Foster. I cannot think his mind a healthy one; and that essay of his on "The aversion of men of taste," etc., I dislike excessively. You do no good by changing the vocabulary of religion. If you change the words, you change the thoughts. They won't translate. There are no synonyms to be found in the dictionary of the Spirit. The more I study language, the more I am convinced of this, that particular shades of thought are wedded to particular words. If you disuse the words, you lose the thought. If you cut the one, you wound the other; they are dermis and epidermis. I find that my best words are Scriptural, my next best ecclesiastical. Take the anthropomorphisms of Scripture. It

indicates a most fastidious narrowness to object to use the strongest of them. A man is often most at rest as regards the ideas in question when he *deliberately* adopts this mode of speech, knowing it to be inadequate, but contentedly using it as the only one that is possible to him. There is no use in guarding against misconstruction, for it is admittedly imperfect, and yet better in its imperfections than the bare literality that would dispense with it. In this, too, the letter kills, and the spirit gives life; and, after all, we must be either anthropopathic in our thoughts of God, or sceptic.

[FERME ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.*]

YOU here see Aristotle and Quintilian combined, working away at St. Paul. Look at his "adjuncta" and "isagoga;" and yet some fine rhetorical flashes. It is very fine to meet with a modern Schoolman, keeping to his quiddities, but pious withal. He must take a logical knife and dissect the Gospel offer to mankind; but he offers it fully, only cutting it up because he thinks it better to offer it piecemeal than in the mass. Ferme must have known Ramus, if he did not know Aristotle. These old theological systematisms were good. I don't want to pull down the old structures, but the old house is sadly in need of a good fresh fire in it.

[CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCES.]

I NEVER tried to turn my mind into an index to an Encyclopædia; and it is that that is

* *Analysis logica in Epistolam Apostoli Pauli ad Romanos.* Edin. 1651.

sought in the classification of the sciences—not of course a Britannica, but a Metropolitana. A methodised index to knowledge is a large con ception, but no one man can produce it. It is not possible perfectly to classify all that is at this time known: each classifier would have his own encyclopædia, for it must be the subjective knowledge of the knower that he classifies. It is just a question of beads and a string. Let us first get the beads anyhow, as the sections of knowledge are mastered, and then we may try to string them together methodically.

[The Telegraphic Age.]

I DON'T much care for all the world becoming next-door neighbours. And we are drifting, drifting, drifting into an awfully materialistic and utilitarian age. I do not like to think of railways in the heart of mountains. They are taking them into Greece and tunnelling Olympus! What a strange thought for a man with any classic reverence in him! They'll be watering the engines at Hippocrene!

THERE are three biographies of which I never tire: Augustine's, Bunyan's, and Halyburton's. The first is by far the deepest, the second the richest and most genial, and with Halyburton I feel great intellectual congruity. He was naturally a sceptic, but God gave that sceptic great faith. His book against the Deists, in which he deals wisely with Lord Herbert, is a scholastic prosecution of Owenian principle.

There are very strange combinations in some men. There was William Law, a mystic, and in his mysticism at times a Christian pantheist, and strongly opposed to imputation. Yet he spoke, as with the sound of a trumpet, upon the practical. The mystical and the practical are seldom so united as they were in him. He indulged in extraordinary speculations—viz. that matter was "sub-concreted" to prevent the angels from seeing into the heart of it. But in practical appeals he is a very Luther. No two men spoke with the sound of a trumpet as did Luther and William Law, the English mystic. They were Boanerges.

FERVOUR. Mysticism is not altogether false. Mysticism only errs when it enters into the province of logic, to destroy it; as logic errs when it trespasses on the domain of intuition, to fetter it. Whenever we worship, we acknowledge that there is a region above us, at once known and unknown, half-clear and half-dark. And I have no fear of the results of religious fervour in worship. Aberrations generally correct themselves in time. It is the total want of fervour that is lamentable. In any other region, fervour is welcomed by men; why not in the sphere of religion? Why should any Christian, and especially any Christian teacher, hold himself aloof from fervid movements? Some of us are perhaps unnaturally calm and cold. And the magnitude of our subject justifies a greater, rather than sanctions a less, fervour than ordinary. There is a good deal of warmth

in the religious life of our time. I anticipate that it may spread over a wide area just now. I question if it will grow as much in depth.

THE Plymouth Brethren assert that there should be no sects, because there is no visible church; nevertheless they add one.

IT is strange that all Christendom becomes Presbyterian on an ordination day.

OUR knowledge of God is apprehensive, never comprehensive; but it is real and presentative, not ideal and representative. Yet it is through the Son that we directly and immediately perceive the Father. If we have seen the Son, we have seen the Father also. But we cannot truly see the Son, without also seeing the Father in him. We dare not separate the personality of the Divine essence. The Father's nature is, in a real sense, adumbrated to man in the Son. And I do not believe in any direct vision of the Father in the future, except as through the Son, and with the Son. I cannot concur with the notion of the Schoolmen, "ultima beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinæ essentiæ." To see "in speculo essentiæ" is impossible to the creature. To comprehend the relations subsisting between the created and the Creator, we must first make a leap out of our creaturehood. But as to the Son, as "the express image" of the Father, I have at times a glorious high gleaming of the truth, that

"In Him all the Father shone, substantially expressed."

There is nothing possible to the one nature not possible to the other, except the necessity of abiding on the Throne. But this is so high a theologeme that it vanishes soon. It is granted to the intuition of faith, but cannot be propositionally worded. And so it is with all high intuitions. They gleam on us; but they are the distilled essence of distillations: and if you try to seize them and detain them for examination, straight they evanish in cloud. They won't allow you to dissect them, because you cannot get them near the dissecting table. They often arise on me in the meditation of a text; and that which most of all suggests them, is the life and words of Jesus Christ.

I DO not understand the aversion of the scientific mind to believe in sudden changes of character. When you have to deal with the human will and the Divine will, you have two incalculable, incommensurable forces, which no doctrine of "averages" can compute. There are shocks and cataclasms in the moral region quite unknown in the physical, and of which the earthquake and volcano are poor analogies. When C. Malan said to me, on an ever-to-be-remembered day, "You have got God's word in your mouth," I felt as if a flash of spiritual electricity had then passed through me. But the old nature asserted itself right in the face of that word, and refused for a while to receive the death-wound. I sat all day on a seat; I could neither speak nor think. I lay passive; all

my past life and thoughts seemed to rush through me. I had the feeling that, could I have taken them down, there were materials in that day's thoughts for a lifetime's meditation; and yet that they were not mine, for I seemed not to think but to be thought upon. Now that must not be an infrequent experience. The shock, when all that is within rises up and refuses to be slain,* accompanied with a desire to be slain too by the only bloodless Conqueror, till at length the soul yields, and dies that it may live. But there is not always pain at the new birth of the soul. God forbid that my way of coming to Him should be at all a common one. If a man feels, as I then felt, what sin really designs, that it really designs deicide, his mind may indeed stagger for a time. It is just because God is usually "not in all our thoughts," that this is not realised. I own that my conscience does not feel this so strongly as my intellect discerns it. . . . I would be bound to love God for what He is in Himself, even while his very nature was inflicting punishment on myself. I believe I would be morally bound for ever to adore the justice that banished me. And I would not deny that hopeless love is still the devil's duty.

I AM not conscious of the supernatural. I am only conscious of the natural, of faculties and states. But I *know* a great deal more.

* That moment, when I was conscious of a revulsion against my renovation, has entered as a *fact* into all my subsequent theologising.

I am cognisant or apprehensive of a great deal more than I am conscious of. In short, I "know" more, using that common word in its catholic signification, and not in that of any particular school.

[Surely we are conscious of the supernatural as the antithesis of the natural?]

But that is only the *caput mortuum* again. It is only as a *fact* attested that the supernatural has any hold over me. The miraculous is a question of *fact*, not of philosophy; of testimony, not of speculation—and God can testify as well as man. He can be his own witness-bearer. How are we to know that a miracle *has* taken place, admitting that it can? Not otherwise than by testimony. All *fact* is vouched for either by the report of our own senses, or by testimony. Philosophy and criticism can do a great deal to purify the matter objected to us, but they cannot bear evidence. In the case of the miraculous, the senses cannot now aid us, because the age of miracle is past; but testimony is sufficient for me. The prophet or evangelist, seeing the miracle, or hearing the voice, had evidence which satisfied him. I have not his consciousness, and cannot tell how he felt in presence of these exceptional phenomena. I have no right to speak of it. He may have felt just as I do when supernaturally wrought upon. But I cannot tell. He speaks as one having authority to speak of matters of which I am necessarily ignorant. But our only test of the genuineness of this inspiration is the evidence of *result.* Two men, Isaiah and

Bouddha, claim inspiration. I cannot know the subjective conditions of either. The result, the record, is our only criterion, for the inspired man alone can know what *it* is to be inspired.

[Then you may have critical tests by which to judge; and a standard, in the result which remains—the revelation which stands the test.]

Well, I suppose the Scriptures, as a series of documents, are their own best witness-bearers. But the Christian evidence is marvellously cumulative. I believe that what our modern men call the "internal evidence" is by far the deepest. But it is incommunicable. Can you *describe Light?* There is no doubt that we cannot *explain* our reception of Christianity. It is too deep for explanation. But we may say it comes to us along the plane of *fact*, as distinguished from that of the pure reason. The reason enters into three things: axioms, primitive beliefs, and the syllogistic nexus. Facts, again, have *evened* (eveniunt). Mathematical axioms, primitive beliefs, and syllogistic vincula, have not evened. This distinction has some value. Of Christianity itself we say *evenit.* It is a great historical fact; if we reject it we must *explain* it, to vindicate the rejection; we must find its source in natural causes, and this you cannot do. You can trace the stream so far, and then its waters issue from a hidden fountain-head. Then look at Judaism. It is a deposit, not a growth. The Shemitic mind is more receptive than imaginative. It seems to have received a gift from above, and preserved it, for it was not creative like the Greek mind. And yet was

not Greece, with all her vivid intellection, groping after something in the dark, till it received it from Judea? And if criticism is to account for everything, it must account for Israel's God, and show the genesis of that. *I* say that the whole character of Hebrew history attests the supernatural, and if you add the two nobler chapters from the book of history—the life of Jesus Christ, and the story of the Christian church—destructive criticism has a good deal to account for! Some minds admit the possibility of miracle, but doubt if it has ever been substantiated; because they say they must first know the boundaries of the natural before they can predicate of an event that it is supernatural. But this is really withdrawing their concession as to the possibility of a miracle; because, no matter what the force of the testimony, you might always plead that the margin line of the natural was yet unknown. In short, it is the barren admission that God could work a miracle, but could do nothing *by it*—could not authenticate a revelation thereby.

WE Protestants are all Dissenters. It is necessary to vindicate our dissent, but as necessary for those in the Protestant established Churches to remember that they are dissenters from the Church of Rome;—dissenters but not schismatics. Rome was schismatic in forcing us out. And it would be well for Christendom, if all the members of Christ's catholic church would endeavour to preserve the unity of the *spirit*, and think oftener of the

many and major points in which they agree, than the few and minor ones in which they differ.

[The Theocracy.]

IN a theocracy God is King, and sin is crime. Sin, which is made crime by the theocratic law, is both sin and crime. It is sin as against the Lord of the whole earth, and crime as against the King. Now, if all sin was visited with death under the theocracy, if all sin were theocratic crime, no flesh could live; so holy is God, so sinful is man. For example, Divorce is always sin against Him who made man and woman one pair; but it was not always made theocratic sin, for the law was so regulated as to prevent the rise of unbridled divorce; always a *peccatum contra Deum*, it was not always a *crimen contra regem.* Wherever *peccata* are at the same time *crimina*, it is excision from the presence of the Lord, and no flesh could stand that. Every crimen was a peccatum, but every peccatum was not a crimen. Every criminal was *eo ipso* responsible to God for his peccata, not every peccator responsible for crimina.

There are three main heads of Mosaic Law—

1. *Law Moral;* for which there is strictly no theocratic punishment. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour," etc. If a Jew did not do that, he sinned a sin deserving punishment. But he could not be stoned for it. There was no theocratic punishment.

2. *Law Ceremonial;* which had a double relation—*first*, to the law moral; *second*, to the

law judicial. This ordained that sacrifices were to be brought for sin. But these could not atone for ἁμαρτία; for Adonai was injured, whenever any of his creatures were injured.

3. *Law Judicial*, civil jurisprudence. . . .

Now how far have we to do with the Judaical law? Is it obligatory except on the Hebrews? Certainly we have not to do with the Mosaic law in its Sinaitic form. There is certainly an abrogation of that. It was but for a time. Yet the moral law of Adonai is eternally obligatory; and in room of the laws of Sinai, we have positive Christian institutions for all time to come. These are the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, which are to remain in the Christian Church "till the end of the eon."

"IF Christ be in you," says an apostle, "the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is alive because of righteousness." It is a fathomless depth, that of our union with Christ, which I cannot yet see far into. It is clear enough that we, by believing in Christ, die, and that we die in the very act of faith. But there is a point which I would like to see into, but which I do not yet see into—viz., the condemnation of sin, in the death of Christ. Christ "condemned sin in the flesh." I think we run away with one-half of the truth on this point, and Rome runs away with the other half (we, *i.e.* the post-reformers, for I don't charge the Reformers themselves with it). The death of Christ, when sin lay upon him, was, I think, the condemnation of all that so lay upon him, with

the pardon of their persons, and the execution or destruction of their sins. Condemnation of sin to death goes along with the adjudication of persons to life. Christ died for the destruction of sin, but for the salvation of the unjust. But I would like to understand more thoroughly the force of the condemnation of sin in the flesh of Christ. "He that hath suffered in the flesh, hath ceased from sin." I do not understand that saying yet. When our sins were laid upon our Lord, what took place was a condemnation of *them*. The sins of his disciples were then sentenced to be destroyed. So you see how intimately our justification and our sanctification are connected; and our justification, when we apprehend it deeply enough, is the virtual execution of our sins. It is the sentence of God to slay our sins, and to save our persons. And here we stand between two ultras. It is the evil extreme of Romanism, that it deprives sanctification of its legal grounds; and it is the evil of an ultra-protestantism that it stops short at the act of justification, or omits the very close nexus between it and sanctification; the connection is not insisted on so much as the distinction. The judicial sentence passes into effect, and all that passes in our sanctification, is adjudicated in our justification. It takes place *personally* in our union to Christ, but it is all virtually contained in the life and death of Christ himself. God's pardon of our persons, and the execution of our sins, both take place in our being (as the apostle says) "crucified with Christ;" nor can I ever consider justifi-

cation and sanctification further separated than as a legal sentence, and the actual execution of it. . . . Christ came to "condemn sin in the flesh;" and that the *Law* could not do, because it was "weak through the flesh." But the law could always say of sin that it was a moral evil; and so it becomes an important question, in what sense it could not *condemn* sin? The apostle also tells us that "the strength of sin is the law." The law, therefore, which is its strength, cannot condemn it. It denounces it, and is wroth against it. But it cannot destroy it. Rather the opposite. The law may pass sentence on the wrong-doer, and even place him under the ban of the empire; as in that old German sentence of outlawry, "We turn thee forth upon the ways of the world, and *no man can sin against thee.*" But I have no doubt that when Christ "made his soul an offering for sin," the sentence then went forth that all sin atoned for was to be put out of being, out of existence. . . . That justification precedes sanctification is another of the ultraisms of modern Protestantism. I cannot receive that doctrine. *Faith* precedes justification, but regeneration causally precedes faith. It is therefore very important to remark initially that all flows from Christ and our union to Him. The only difficulty with me is why glorification does not immediately take place on our union with Christ, because the immediate point of union with Christ should be perfect holiness and blessedness. But God has so planned it that there must be an order in the development of our lives.

Wisest God says, no—
This must not yet be so;

And the Christian has to realise (what it is sometimes very hard for him to realise) that he is now "seated with Christ in heavenly places," while he is fighting away upon the earth. The transition "from grace to glory" is not greater than is the transition "from nature to grace."

WHEN men come to adopt a stereotyped manner of recognising God, or of conversion to Him, you may be sure there is some human conceit in it. There was Nathaniel, a man truly awakened, who had not heard the facts of the life and death of Christ; and as to Cornelius, I think he was a καινὸς ἄνθρωπος before Peter saw him: "He feared God and wrought righteousness," and "his prayers and alms came up as a memorial before God." This is not affirmable of him unless he was "justified." The same reasoning which would lead me to doubt that Cornelius was justified, would lead me to believe that the seventh chapter of the Romans was the description of an irregenerate man; and Peter's errand to Cornelius, to show him "the things commanded of God," presents no difficulty on the other side. His words are *very* significant: "Of a truth I perceive that God is *no respecter of persons*, but in *every nation* he that feareth Him and worketh righteousness, is *accepted* of Him." How dim must the ground of the faith of thousands have been for centuries. . . . .
I preach a free gospel to every man, or I don't

preach the gospel at all, but I know that its acceptance without the help of the Spirit is an impossibility. I am not going to hinder a man from attempting an impossibility. I would never forbid him to try his strength to come to God, while I hold that he cannot do so without the help of the Spirit. Calvinism is not inconsistent with a free gospel. I would like to see a divine arise in whom Jonathan Edwards and Thomas Boston were thoroughly welded into one.

[Conscience and the Atonement.]

We are asked to throw aside every *theory* of the Atonement, and repose in the *fact*. But I cannot receive the Atonement as a *blank* mystery, though it is ultimately inscrutable and incognisable, as are all great truths. I speak with trembling, but I doubt that the *fact* of an Atonement would not be clear to me apart from its reasons and relations. God announces to conscience the principles upon which it can rest. Can God be just, and pardon me? I must know the consistency between these two things, before I believe in their union; and I don't think I go farther than the Scripture carries me. It seems to me a terrible thing to say that there was no intrinsic necessity for Christ's death, for then we virtually say that he died for sin that he need not have died for; and it seems to me that we have the softer theology who affirm he did not, and could not. And I think that to die for the sake of sinners whose sin is not actually taken away, would be a clear waste of moral action.

So that we must either with the Calvinist deny the universal extent of the Atonement, or with the Socinian eviscerate its meaning. And I think that Magee, in his book on the Atonement, has sold himself into the hands of the Calvinists, though he is ever bringing in a salvo against them. Does God pardon as a mere sovereign? He either pardons arbitrarily, or he pardons on the ground of some atonement. Now I hold that conscience demands that vicariousness which history and experience bring before us. This is the very antithesis of Kantianism. Kant may be right as regards the conscience in its crude and unenlightened state. For conscience is out of order through the fall. But conscience quickened by contact with the divine word, demands a satisfaction which man has not rendered, and is unable to render. It is also true that the healthy conscience repudiates the legal element separated from the moral and vital; it repudiates justification divorced from sanctification: a justification that left us as it found us, conscience would disown. What it demands and approves is not an extrinsic act, but an intrinsic fact. Christ came that I might have life, and this includes both a justified and a sanctified life.

[*How* does conscience demand vicariousness?]

Conscience asserts that a *gratuitous pardon* would not be *just*. If I appeal to conscience rigorously, it tells me that it would be unrighteous to give men a blank pardon. It cries out for restitution of some sort, and expiation of some sort. And again, while conscience proclaims the fact, that man's

nature is out of order, and that it cannot rectify its own disorder, experience attests the fact, that the image of God wrested from us at the fall, is in the process of restoration through Jesus Christ. The evidence to the individual is the congruity of that which Christ brings to him, with his nature, and its power to rectify his disorder; and the congruity between the restored Divine image within and the Divine image without, is vouched more by faith than by consciousness. Kant is of too individualising a tendency in morals. He does not recognise the unity of the race in either of its representatives,—either in the first man, or in the second. But the umbilicus refutes him; we are all united, both in our degeneracy through one man, and in our recovery through another.

[Merit and Demerit.]

KANT has ventured on some false correlations. As sin implies demerit, virtue he thinks implies merit. *Kant's correlate is my disparate.* The first two, sin and demerit, are annexed to each other by a *moral necessity;* while the latter virtue (obedience) has for its sequel not merit but happiness, and they are related not necessarily but *de pacto.* Kant omits the fact that we are in a state of forfeiture of good, and *deserve* evil. Merit is not necessarily annexed to obedience. Merit exists only when there is *inherent* good. Now there is no inherent good in the volitions of any creature, but only in the volitions of God. There is no sufficiency within the will to ensure the creature's standing. If so, the creature cannot stand without the

divine upholding; and must fall on the withdrawal of that upholding, while the upholding is not a matter of right, but of sovereignty. There can be no claim of rights on the creature's part, and no impugning of the divine justice, should the creature be "left" to the freedom of its own will, as the Westminster divines put it.

[But this suspends the destiny of the universe upon acts of Divine volition; is it not better to connect these with an "immutable and eternal morality?"]

It is a *holy will* that rules the universe—a will in which loving-kindness is locked up, to be in due time displayed. It is a solemn thing that we and all creatures are at the disposal of pure will; but it is not merely *free* will, it is the free will of the holy Lord Jehovah, and therein it is distinguished from the abstractness and apparent arbitrariness of *mere* will. For the theology of this, I may have been learning more, as time has run on; but for the principle of its inmost nature, I believe that God taught it me during those three days in Aberdeen, when my will surrendered *at discretion.* I was taught the error of the will's independency through a most terrible experience. I learned the Divine sovereignty once for all, as by a flash of lightning, and a mournful tranquillity came down. I felt that *I* was blameable every way. The spirit was *broken;* and I remembered that the Lord is nigh unto them that are of a broken heart: and I looked up, and lo! the burden was gone.

"HE'S at least *sincere*," is a common saying, in defence of a man whose opinions or actions may be very far astray, and it exonerates the man from the charge of hypocrisy. Of course that is something. It is "a soul of good" (if you will) "in things evil." I doubt not that the present Pope is a very sincere Papist; and I believe that Torquemada was a very sincere inquisitor; and some of the Scribes and Pharisees had a zeal according to the law, and "touching its righteousness" might have been "blameless." But that he has acted conscientiously does not prove that a man has done his duty. In other matters, sincerity is not held to be the equivalent of duty. If a man is sincere in his debts, that won't exonerate him. Now, if a man misconstrues what God reveals, though he is sincere in a measure, he is blameworthy to the extent of his light. God has spoken to men in his Word. How would a man take the calling of *his* word in question? He could not tolerate that, but would justly resent it. And though God bear long with it, he must deal with us as a father with suspicious or heedless children. And our not giving heed to what God says is a most serious aggravation of our sin. Its first element is our not *yielding* to him, our want of filial submission. The creature's first duty is to be what God made him. His next duty is to do what God ordains. He is directly responsible for these things. He is only secondarily responsible for inquiry. But the great want in all men who inquire is the want of a simple

love of truth, and the want of the "single eye." A man sees double because of his prepossessions. . . . Brougham, in his lecture on responsibility for belief, never denied that man is responsible for the act of *inquiry*. He never denied that truth-seeking is a duty; and that impartiality in inquiry is a duty. He admits that man is bound to inquire, and to inquire honestly; but he denies that man can be *forced* to believe, because belief is just the result of evidence presented to the mind. But he denies what I affirm, that we are bound to believe on the authority of God, whenever we have reason to believe that God has really spoken.

[Would not almost every one do so, if *convinced* that God *had* spoken? It is that they find it hard to believe.]

No. I believe that such is the bent of the human spirit away from God, that it will not come unto the light which it knows to be light, just as it often does what is evil while it knows what is good. Paul's confession as to the contrary power within the will, is true also of the intellect, which the will *leads* as well as follows.

[Arminianism.]

IT MAY be, as Arminians impute to Calvinism what we deny, that conversely we controvert an Arminianism which they deny; and so the two parties may be really nearer than the controversy would always indicate. The controversy is sometimes merely one

of *emphasis;* where the emphasis is to be laid; what is major, and what minor. But often it is much deeper. The fact is, however, that the Calvinist affirms a grace of God towards his own children, which the Arminian denies towards any creature; so that Calvinism is an intensive exhibition of Divine grace, while Arminianism presents us with an extensive and diffusive one. . . . What is it that the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian attribute to subjective grace (grace in the soul of man) distinct from moral suasion, that is not *enthusiastic*—a sort of spiritual galvanism? They neither allow enough to man, nor enough to God. They divide the process in a most arbitrary fashion: one half they give to God, the other half to man; but are these two independent? does the one not permeate and pervade the other? We hold that the process is not halved and separately shared, but united and conjunctly shared. The whole is God's, the whole is also man's. The τὸ θέλειν is wholly man's; the ἐνέργεια τὸ θέλειν is wholly God's. In the fallen nature, the elective faculty remains undestroyed. Its destruction would be the destruction of humanity; and though we are in one sense *passive* in regeneration, in another sense we are not. We yield our wills up to the active ἐνέργεια of the Higher will.

[The Nature of Free Will.]

IT is foolish to dismiss the question of Free will, as an insoluble problem of meta-

physics. Let no man despise a metaphysical problem. Some say "that is metaphysical," as if it was therefore unpractical or foolish because insoluble. But to deride such a question, is to deride what is to some minds (and I own it is to mine), the very deepest chord within it. It is like saying to a man of a sensitive nervous organisation, "Now become a muscular Christian at once!" The will *is* a metaphysical question, and is not an *utterly* hopeless puzzle, though it is also a practical question, vitally practical. My metaphysical position consists in having no theory as to the nature of freedom, but maintaining the fact, while I disown and repudiate four ultra theories; two pairs of opposites, one pair on either side of the controversy. I disown the liberty of *independence.* I disown the liberty of *indifference.* I maintain that the will's freedom is *less* than these theories assert it to be. On the other side, I disown the "freedom *from* co-action" *without* the will (external bondage), and freedom from co-action *within* the will (internal bondage), as too meagre. I maintain that the freedom of the will is *more* than these theories concede. I thus stand between two pairs of ultra theories. The liberty, which is the ground of accountability, is *more* than freedom *from* restraint, whether it be within or without the will itself. It is *less* than the liberty of independency, and *less* than the liberty of indifference. Independency is just Epicureanism. Disown that and the theory of indifference, and what remains but that the will's agency is elective

and selective? Man makes an election. God is remotely the cause of that action's causality (the cause of its causality, mark), and *à fortiori* of its *good;* and yet, while he is so, he does not, in being so, take away that freedom of will which might end in a bad volition. God's ἐνέργεια is not galvanism, it is a vitalising act. There is a saying of the good Rutherford, difficult for us to acquiesce in, but true I think in principle; to this effect: The *permission* of sin is adorable, the *actual fact* of sin is abominable. As to the permissio, there would certainly have been no *display* of some of the Divine attributes had sin not been. They would have been conserved for ever in the depths of the adorable Godhead. The reality of sovereign love toward rebellious children could not have been displayed without a fall. This is the basis of a *modified* optimism. . . . In a certain sense I am a tremendous free-willer. My predestination is all free will. God created the universe for his glory and the manifestation of his attributes. He might have lived without a universe beneath Him. If the universe has a *necessary* ground of existence, it must be both eternal and infinite. It is therefore fundamental in theology that creation was for the manifestation of the Divine perfection. But I shrink from assuming that these perfections must necessarily have been displayed. The Divine perfections do not necessitate any act, but they qualify and condition every Divine act. . . . As to the Divine Will, I am vehemently anti-Edwardean. His system of

determinism leads to the *necessity* of creation. I *inferred* this when I first read his treatise on the will, and I find it carried out in his other treatise on God's chief end in creation. But my position is much more a theologeme than a philosophical postulate. And yet, if you substitute Jehovism for necessitarianism (which is proximately Providence and virtually predestination), very many difficulties are mitigated. And after all, necessitarianism in the brain can do little harm to the man who in heart relishes the Sermon on the Mount, *e.g.* Chalmers. I do not say that the *theory* of philosophical necessity is innocuous. I believe it is noxious. But look at the Edwardean theology, omitting this, its metaphysical blot. It was steeped in the affections. That will keep any man safe amid intellectual aberration, and prevent it telling on his life. In the Edwardean Ethics you see a fine moral stoical Christianity in conjunction with the finest affections.

I HAVE long thought that without an eternal Logos you must have an eternal cosmos; and I therefore suspect that *a mono-personal Theism is impotent against the Pantheist.* So that since the controversy has passed from its old atheistic phases, I doubt if either Deist or Socinian, or Mahommedan, will be able to cope with the Pantheist. In short, I doubt if any but a Trinitarian can do so adequately.

[How does the admission of an eternal Logos negative an eternal cosmos?]

I don't so clearly *see* it as I *feel* it.

But if God had not always a Son, he must have always had a world; and if he had always a Son, personality, and conscious life, with reciprocal love, must have always existed. We, at least, get out of the nirvana, or the Indian sleep of Brahm. Besides, the doctrine of an eternal Logos harmonises with the notion of a Deity essentially active, and perfect within himself.

NOTES of a CONVERSATION between Dr. DUNCAN and V.V., October 1861; V.V.'s remarks being within brackets, thus: [ ].

I GOT no rest to the sole of my foot till I rejected all speculation. What I rejected was not the tendency to speculate, but the pile of speculations.

[But if a tendency remains, a fresh pile must accumulate?]

Well, but what can you make of it? What can you reach? Have you got a philosophy? It would be very strange if Sextus Empiricus, with all his arguments to destroy philosophies, could not get one to destroy yours.

[My philosophy is just the constitution of my nature: I must fall back on that: I have no other court of appeal.]

Well, you can't help believing. I do not wish to shake your faith in that. To weaken confidence in human nature is criminal. But I always think that the Reidist conclusion, "I can't help believing it," is incomplete, without some reason in the nature of things. The

"make of my constitution" is a testimony to its Maker, and I want to get out of myself, and beyond myself. Do you not see that without this you are in miserable bondage to a can't-help-myself-ism?

[Well, I just can't help it, and you can't take me higher. I cannot conclude otherwise than that my nature affirms rightly, and that its Maker is good and true.]

But you must reach a belief in something out of yourself. Conscience is not produced by me; and it testifies to another beyond me. Conscience is the voice of a lawgiver. I think we get out of ourselves, to a rock higher than we are, if we follow conscience to its source. I affirm that conscience testifies to law, to moral law; and that not in the secular sense in which the physicists use it, nor in the sectarian sense in which the mathematicians use it, but in the primitive moral sense in which the lawyers use it, as the expression of an authoritative will. The naturalists have no right to the term law, if they do not admit that they have stolen it from the lawyers. There is no such thing as a "law" of nature, except in a figurative sense. The laws of nature do not lead me beyond my own generalising mind, but moral law does; for if there be not another above me, my Lawgiver, then there is no law for me. You see I wish to get beneath the voice of my nature, to the Maker of my constitution.

[If, from "the make of our constitution," you reach its Maker, and are able to infer his character, does that not enhance rather than dimi-

nish the difficulty of the entrance of evil into his universe?]

How so? Evil is a fact, but not an entity. It is not a "thing" at all. It is a minus quality, like a deficit in a merchant's ledger. If it were a positive entity, I think we could say that either it could not enter into the universe at all, or else that God directly created it. It is a mystery how it ever entered a perfectly good universe, and appeared amongst beings created perfectly good (and therefore without even its germs), while their Creator had no share in its *production.* It is a product, and the product of the creaturely will, but it is a negative quantity. And if it had not entered, we could not have seen how God could do a greater thing than permit it—viz. *put it away;* the greatest Divine act, I believe, ever done in the universe: and the few rays of light that Scripture gives us as to the former are always connected with the latter. Christianity does not tell me all I would like to know—it does not meet all my speculations; but while it enlightens my reason as to my duties, it gives me sufficient light as to the ultimate mysteries, to prevent their paralysing me altogether. I should like to know if you admit that we are fallen creatures. If we are now what we were made, the demiourgos must either be a very poor being, or a very melancholy creature. Do you admit that we are fallen creatures?

[There are contrarieties within us now that I can scarcely think necessary to our constitution. They seem to point to a better state

from which we have declined, and to which we may yet return.]

Yes; they are both historic and prophetic. But there is more than contrariety—there is *anarchy*. The world of mankind has cast off allegiance to its King. And what do you take the present state of the world to be? Why, we are under the ban of the empire. Don't think that because sin is merely privative, it is less horrible than if it were positive, or less terrible in its consequences. It is privative of good to man, and of communion with God. And yet God, having a design of saving mankind (all or some is another question), has placed the whole human race under a system of long-suffering kindness; while they are nevertheless in the state of condemned criminals under the King's reprieve—allowed, it is true, the best of prison fare; and, under the moral philosophers' keeping, the prison is not quite so dirty as it might otherwise be.

[The moral philosophers have been more than prison warders; they have been prophets and teachers to humanity.]

I don't think they have done *much* more than keep the prison clean, and do effective police work, and that is not an ignoble task. I am not despising one of them. And I had rather be a jailor in the house of my God, than dwell in the tents of wickedness. But come, let us turn from this. I must take you, my friend, to the centre of all things. You have read the Gospels. Well, can you conceive anything more beautiful than the character of Jesus Christ?

[No.]

Is it not the perfection of humanity?

[It is.]

Could you have invented it?

[No.]

Could the four Evangelists have invented it?

[I think not.]

No; the inventor would be greater than the invention. Jesus Christ, then, is the perfection of humanity, its ideal made real. Whence then came this perfection? Did a Jewish human nature realise its own perfection?

[That it was from above I doubt not; but it is the unity of the Son with the Father in that human life which I cannot conceive. *Practically* I realise, and admit that He was Divine.]

Conceive! *Conceive* that unity between Father and Son? What do you mean? We cannot conceive it, and we have no theory regarding it. Let us look at the various hypotheses that have been started; and amongst them you may be disposed to place the Athanasian; but that I take to be not one, but a denial of all hypotheses, affirming the incomprehensibility of the union, and denying all the explanations of it. Every hypothesis is the root of a heresy. First, in Athanasianism, there is a denial of Tritheism, and a denial of Sabellianism. What does Sabellius make of his attempt to theorise, ἡ μονὰς πλατυνθεῖσα γέγονε τριάς. That is a perfectly barren saying. It casts no light on the mystery, but verges towards a heresy. Now consider the attestations of Scripture. No one can read the Old Testa-

ment without seeing that that book is strictly Monotheistic. No one can say that Jesus and his apostles did not preach a Monotheistic doctrine. Yet when Jesus Christ and his apostles went about preaching, they said many things which were staggering to a monopersonal Monotheism; and some divines in their interpretations of Christ's words have fallen into a Tritheistic theism. But the propositions to which a Christian assents, have been clearly and concisely stated by a not very religious person, Dean Swift, thus:—

> There are three, the Father, and the Son, and the
> Holy Ghost;
> The Father is different from the Son, and from the
> Holy Ghost.
> The three are one.

[That statement does not include the word "*person.*"]

Well, it is not used in Scripture, except in one passage, "the express image of his person." I affirm that three persons of *men* are three *beings* of men, and three persons of *angels* would be three *beings* of angels. But to affirm this of the Divine nature would be Tritheism. And so I am forced to the conclusion that the word "person," as applied to God, must be different from that word as applied to man. But what that is, I do not know, because I am not God. You will see that there is a mystery about the doctrine of God, which we would need ourselves to be God to know, and the light of glory will not dissipate that mystery.

[But it is on the resemblance of personality in

God and man, that you found the great postulate that man is made in the image of God. Is not the one doctrine the equivalent of the other, and both the basis of all revelation?]

Well, the natures resemble. But the archetype, and the type are not identical. Man is like unto God, made in his image, but God is also infinitely unlike man. I see no contradiction between these two, and I am precluded from all *deductive* reasonings, founded upon that word "person" (such as, because three persons in man are three beings, three persons in God are also three beings), because I abjure an absolute identity or commonness of nature between God and man.

[But since you hold that man's nature is in the image of God's, and the centre of man's nature is his personality, must not *personality* be the same in both?]

Similar, but not the same. It is surely enough that the type resemble the archetype without being identical with it. If identical, the difference would vanish, like Hegel's *seyn = nichts.* As to the Divine personality, my propositions are twofold—first, that the Divine Being or essence is truly and properly *one;* and second, that this unity is not incompatible with a moral threefoldness; and I find that this is described by the personal pronouns in Scripture. It is the attempt to clear up the mystery further that I attack; every intelligible explanation I reject. I don't know what the Divine personality *is;* but I know that it *is not* as this, or that, or the other theory would try to make it out. It is not Tri-

theistic, and it is not Sabellian. But I *cannot* know it unless I were to know the modus of the eternal generation, and the spiration of the Holy Ghost, *i.e.* become God myself. It is beyond the reach of definition then, as an Athanasian once said to an Arian, who had asked him to explain eternal generation: "Tell me how God *is*, that we may both go mad." And I am strongly of opinion that it is not only not revealed, but that it is not *revealable.* And there may be much that is not cognisable by finite minds, with which nevertheless the glory of God's character is concerned, and with which the redemption of the world is upbound; while God may simply tell us *that it is so.* Sabellianism does violence to the Scripture texts. Scripture continually uses the personal pronouns, implying that the Father is God, that the Son is God, and that the Holy Ghost is God, which Sabellianism admits; but then, while trying to make the trinal unity intelligible, it makes the acts of the Three unintelligible; it makes the atonement an unintelligibility, for how could an Infinite Being make an atonement *to himself* under another condition or relation?[*] Sabellianism makes one phase of the Divine nature atone to another phase of it.

[I was going to say that Sabellianism might fit in to another theory of the atonement.]

What theory? Athanasianism is just the negation of all possible *theory* on the subject of Christ's person; and so, too, of his work. All the heresies are just explanations of the mystery. What theory?

[I was thinking of the atonement of *Love*, the Divine nature not requiring an offering to be made to it, but offering itself.]

But to what purpose? For what end? Did Christ subject himself for no purpose to an ignominious death?

[No.]

Well, for what purpose?

[To bless, and to save; and that by the mere impulse of love itself.]

Admitting that the death of Christ was substitutionary, I can see great love in it; but otherwise, I can't see love in it at all. Take away the substitution, and all that remains for me is this: "Jesus tried to make us good; but, good man, *he failed.*" This end, in view, is glorious when combined with the other end, but melancholy when you take it alone.

[But if he failed, he failed on both theories.]

No: his intention was, on the one theory, to make the world good; that has been a failure. But on the other (which, again, I say is *no theory*), he finished his work; and secured the *ultimate* destruction of sin in those in whom the experiment of making them good is for the present most imperfectly successful. But to return to the personality of God and man, it comes to this, that with all simplicity of mind we must receive God's propositions, that three persons of men are three beings, three persons of angels are three beings, the three persons in God are *not* three beings: so that, *in theologising*, I have risen to the word "person," and found in it a certain uniqueness of meaning,

which is an induction from Scripture texts; leaving the mystery which is round about it as an *ultimatum* which I cannot use in deductive reasoning. But I need *some word* to express the distinction within the Divine nature, and I find the personal pronoun "He," and a personal act, "He will send." Now Tritheism gives a false explanation, so does Sabellianism; Athanasianism gives none: and anything that starts up as an explanation is *therefore* to be rejected. No; you only *think* you conceive the Divine unity. You cannot really conceive it. Meditation on it leads us up to propositions which have come out of the mouth of Him whom we cannot comprehend, and whom to comprehend would imply the possession of Godhead. And the relations subsisting between the persons of the Godhead I know not, and have no expectation of ever knowing. I don't think Gabriel knows, and I don't think he can.

[Do you extend this principle to the relations subsisting between the Divine nature and the universe?]

Necessarily; and all the schemes in explanation err by attempting to define the indefinable. Pantheism, for example, stumbles over the problem, and abolishes the relation in the attempt to explain it.

[How do you meet Pantheism?]

Pantheism will not account for the facts of biblical history. It cannot explain the life of Jesus Christ, without explaining it away. And Pantheism will not account for the phenomena of conscience. God must be distinct from the cosmos, or conscience is all a lie.

[Is it the mere voice of conscience that you oppose to Pantheism?]

No; but conscience is the great root of Theism, and it leads within the veil, because the tree that springs from it breaks through phenomena. It is something supernatural within the natural, and there is no separating these two spheres, if you are true to psychology. The web of the natural and the supernatural are so woven together in the soul, that they cannot be untied.

[It is easier to dethrone Pantheism than to establish the opposite truth.]

If you overthrow the one, you establish the other. There is no resting-place between them. If we find that there are beings with conscience and will; and, more especially, if we find that some of these are *bad*, and if we admit the full force of moral evil in the will, as the antithesis of good, Pantheism cannot account for that antithesis. A monistic scheme of the universe must minimise evil, or reason it away. You admit, I suppose, the reality of moral evil?

[Yes.]

And its personal taint you do not deny?

[No.]

Being under law, you are under a lawgiver, and the law is not self-imposed. In the physical region, law is only metaphoric, but in the moral it avers that you are the subject of an extrinsic authority. Your reason tells you that obligation implies an obliger.

[But is not the use of the word "law" in theology also metaphoric, and does it not arise from the notion of human law?]

You reason in a circle. What is the foundation of human law? Either God or the hangman.

[No; it may be the naturally destructive consequences of crime.]

Why then, if that be all, can society interpose to punish? Suppose there be no eternal and immutable law of right, what right have criminal courts, or Lords and Commons (from whom they derive power), to try me for crime and punish me?

[There may be a tacit agreement founded on expediency.]

What tacit agreement is there between the Sultan and his subjects? Under a despotism there is no room for pactions, tacit or explicit; and civil power, with right to punish, arose, not by consent of the people, but from a despotic assumption, or from transmitted authority. You may gather, both from history and from consciousness, that law is the emanation of the will of a superior having authority. Kant saw clearly that moral law implied a lawgiver. I can see no daylight whatever as to law without this assumption. Even the so-called physical laws are to me incomprehensible without a lawgiver.

[A physical law without a lawgiver is just a succession of sequences.]

That doctrine is the abortion of modern philosophy, though it is as old as the fall. To thrust all noumena out of our system of the universe, is to give up philosophy in despair.

[You have given up the philosophies as failures.]

I renounce the phenomenal schemes by abiding fast in the region of the noumena. I begin with the greatest noumenon—God. And causality is a noumenal fact; causes and effects are phenomena. I see and hear causes and effects, and they fall within the circle of experience; but I never saw and never heard a noumenon. Yet they are more real, because more abiding, than that which we can see and hear. Well, I think you will admit that the Cause of Conscience must be *moral.* The distinction between right and wrong must be in my Maker, unless I made myself. And in affirming the moral nature of man, you abolish Pantheism, because you indirectly affirm the moral nature of God. Conscience is imperative, and that very imperativeness it has belongs to it as a manifestation of God's will. What can be more imperative than will?

[Suppose we say a manifestation of his *nature* rather than of his *will?*]

But it is *both.* It is at once a revelation of his character and of his law. Ethics without law is as bad in theology as law without ethics. And so far as conscience is ethical, it is a manifestation of God's nature in man; so far as it is law, it is a manifestation of his will. A purely legal system, which would be arbitrary legality, or a purely ethical system, which would put aside all legality and make us in a measure equals to associate with God—legal equals—are opposite extremes. Both systems lead to atheology. People seldom see the issue of the latter system—the purely ethical. But, while it ig-

nores the legal element, it leads to a system of legal equality between God and man, or to a doctrine of which that is the logical end. If the legal is sunk in the ethical, duty vanishes. We may still say it is a beautiful and fitting thing to exercise love to God and man, and the opposite is excessively ugly and unbecoming; but there's an end of it. We cannot call the want of holiness sin and crime. For this we require the legal element. But then the legal is a part of human nature, and jurisprudence is a science. . . .

CHRIST either deceived mankind by conscious fraud, or he was himself deluded and self-deceived, or he was Divine. There is no getting out of this trilemma. It is inexorable.

[Two Doctrines of Ignorance.]

WE may ask ourselves, Is it our duty to philosophise? If not, we may again ask, Is it our interest? For duty and interest may go hand in hand. My philosophising has done me two good things—it has exercised the faculties, and taught me their limits. . . . . I find that there may be two doctrines of ignorance—the one of which may minify, if it does not nullify, the second. The one cuts man off from God hopelessly, and deprives me of my two great texts—the first declaring our original (the *terminus a quo*)—"God made man in his own image;" the second announcing our destination (the *terminus ad quem*)—"the

new man, which is renewed in righteousness after the image of Him that created him." But the other doctrine of Ignorance is a lesson on the limits of our faculties, and abases the pride of the intellect. As interpreted against the Pantheist and ultra-ontologist, I am inclined to think that Sir William Hamilton's arguments are either true or contain the truth. But I cannot do without transcendentalism as the corrective of anthropopathy; nor without anthropopathy as the corrective of transcendentalism. And do you not feel that when you have fully imbibed one great Truth, or phase of the truth, you experience a recoil from it towards what is almost its antagonist error, till at length a middle point is reached—not the zero of indifference, but the larger whole, in which extremes are lost? For example, dwelling on the incommunicable perfections of God, you must either allow the thought of them to wither up the intellect, or surrender yourself absolutely to the anthropopathic language of Scripture, which you feel, while you surrender yourself to it, to be altogether inadequate. You feel that there has been a *συγκατάβασις* in the Scriptures divinely appropriate to man's nature. And you will find that the common sense of common people generally hits the true medium between transcendental notions and a gross anthropopathy. They never think that God has literal eyes, nor that He is only transcendental substance. Transcendentalism is the denial of that which renders man's knowledge an inferior kind of

knowledge. Anthropopathy is the withholding of that which renders God's adorable infinity a superior and distinct thing from man's finity. . . .

THERE are innumerable moulds in God's world. Why do we coop up Divine grace within narrow man-made channels, and say, this is the way God has worked and will work. His greatness is noways displayed more illustriously than in the spreading out of his gifts in a thousand different ways. There is a manifoldness in his operation that surely pertains to the *beauty* of his holiness.

IT is a significant fact that the whole Western Church lost the doctrine of justification by faith, from the Apostles' days to Luther's, by confounding justification with sanctification. All the Fathers knew that we were saved through the cross, but none of them apprehended the grounds of our justification: and thus I think it was that many of them lost peace of conscience. Even Augustine, clear and pellucid as he is as to grace, in opposition to Pelágian merit, contemplates grace in us reigning in our sanctification. We learn from this great fact that the deepest life of godliness may co-exist with muddled doctrine. But that is no argument in favour of obscurity.

I LIKE the clear shallow men sometimes; especially I like to listen to their preaching. Even the humdrum theology has its uses. Though there are many things their optics cannot reach

to, these good men sometimes clear away morbidity, and they are always to be preferred to the cuttle-fish divines. It is possible to find a luxury in darkness, and a highly subtile kind of self-indulgence may keep many a man away from the light of God and the peace of Jesus Christ. And there is sometimes a bewitching fascination in melancholy. When one is tremendously introverted, " the grieved soul will consolation shun," and the effort to get out of it may be just another phase of it. You then need to have rebuke administered; and at these times I would not go to hear a genius preach, not even a Chrysostom; I prefer to listen to very clear and very simple words from one who knows how to " rebuke with all faithfulness."

THE Theanthropos is the centre of all things: the centre of the Trinity, the central figure in history, the centre towards which the human heart gravitates, and in the heart of man its centre. This elevates man, and proclaims the worth of his original nature. " He took not on Him the nature of angels;" and probably one reason why the angels that fell not were " confirmed," was that they might be ministering spirits to men.

[CULTURE, AND THE CHIEF END OF MAN.]

THE cultivation of the human faculties is *not* man's chief end. I would say the retention and exertion of all the faculties was the chief end of the unfallen creature.

[Is that not the same thing?]

No; I say *retention*, because man was made in the image of God, and that was made *perfect*, all that was necessary was its retention by exercise.

[But if made perfect, was it not conserved by that very perfectness?]

No; nothing but immutability ensures that, and immutability is a Divine perfection. In a creature it is a contradiction in terms, and would not be perfection. My Thomism leads me to believe in a perpetually present "gratia" upholding the creature, or the creature's fall. Immutability alone ensues impeccability, or an eternal paction made by the Immutable, a purpose of God to conserve. An angel would have no merit in loving the Lord his God with all his heart, soul, mind, and strength to all eternity; and would grow a devil by pride if he either ceased to do so or claimed any merit for doing his duty; though to be and to do good are praiseworthy. I distinguish merit from praiseworthiness. Now we either merit, or we do not. I have no sympathy with that cuttle-fish method of affirming and denying the same thing at the same time—denying merit *ex condigno*, and affirming it *ex congruo.* Rome asserts that we have no merit *ex condigno*, but affirms it *ex congruo*, because it says Christ merited that we should merit.

[But you affirm and yet deny that we have a knowledge of God; you affirm and yet deny that the will is free.]

As to the first, I affirm that we have a knowledge of one kind, but not of another kind, but I do not affirm that we have, and yet have not the same kind of knowledge. As

to the second, I affirm that the will is free, but I deny that it is not influenced by motives in its free volitions. But Rome asserts that we do not merit, and yet that we do merit. That's a direct contradiction, for it is of the same nature that the thing is first denied and then affirmed. . . . As to the end of human action, I say that to cultivate human nature is only a part of it. It is our duty to cultivate the faculties; but, first of all, it is our duty not to have any sin. The law demands that you be what God made you, and that you see you cannot be; and yet you see the law is good. My first concern is to get quit of sin, or to know how God has provided for my extrication; and I defy man or angel to free themselves from guilt without an atonement, and to free themselves from depravity without regeneration. When you have got over these two things, I think we may attend to the cultivation of the faculties.

[But suppose you broaden the idea of culture so as to include the rectification and readjustment of the whole nature, and the increase of its powers to "the measure of the stature of the perfect?"]

You either cannot, or need not. The withdrawal of its disability, and the removal of its stain, must precede the free use of my nature for the glory of God. And if these are effected, what remains but that I, a being made in God's image, have to love Him, and my fellow creatures? Is not that the sum of it? And there's an *infinity* in Him whom we

love supremely, as well as an *indefinity* in those we must love after Him. There would come a time in eternity when we would be *tired* of the enjoyment of God, if there was not an infinity in Him; if there was any bottom to that ocean, or any shore around it.

THE love of Being in general is a cold and barren kind of love. The generality is too vague to touch the heart: but specify, individualise, and the object becomes visible to the heart, and the command instinct with life, and you can love. I cannot comprehend the infinite, eternal, and unchangeable Being, without being myself infinite, eternal, and unchangeable; but I can actively apprehend them without being so; and I can apprehend them *unitively*—*i.e.* apprehend that I am united to that Infinite and Eternal Being. Reason does overleap itself.

[You think it goes, *per saltum*, at one bound, over all barriers, and reaches the Divine, and does not ascend by the steps of a ladder?]

A ladder! There can be no ladder to the Infinite. You are no nearer it at the top of it than at the foot.

[No; but we speak in a figure, of the ladder of analogy. And is not Christ our ladder to the Infinite?]

Yes; if we have seen Him, and know Him, we have seen and know the Father also. But there can be no revelation through Him, if we have not first apprehended the Infinite God, as a person.

[If we look at its moral and spiritual aspects, and not to its historical phenomena, may we not say, that the Incarnation is really the direct ladder to the Infinite? We may have a ladder in the moral, though not in the intellectual sphere.]

But how do we interpret the incarnation? How do you know that the man Christ Jesus is also God, unless you have first got hold of the Infinite, by the condescension of the Infinite itself? My Bible tells me "no man can call Jesus Lord, but by the Holy Ghost;" and my philosophy tells me the same, that there must be a spiritual revelation of this fact before it is credited. But it is the great glory of God's Revelation that it has changed our abstracts into concretes; the infinite existence into the "I Am" of the Old Testament—the personal Jehovah: the infinite love into the personal Christ; and Jonathan Edwards could not have done better than translate his philosophical virtue, or, "love of being in general," into the sum of the ten commandments: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," etc. I speak to the heart surely when I say, that the infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, alone, will not satisfy it. The holy, the just, and the good, are needed. We must concrete our abstracts.

IT is most uncharitable to judge of a man's reverence by its expression. It may be a mere matter of temperament. The average mind cannot easily be taught to make allow-

ances for temperament, because it cannot appreciate its opposite types. Now the Saxon character is naturally *repressive* of emotion. The Celtic is naturally *expressive* of feeling; and the different types of the Celt, the French, the Gaelic, the Irish, express their feelings differently. They are all capable of strong emotion. The Celtic nature is almost never apathetic. But with the Frenchman it becomes "a scene;" with the Gael, pathos; with the Irishman, humour, or pathos dashed with humour.

I HAVE a great regard for the Humourists, for they are generally men of a tender heart. Both Charles Lamb and Thomas Hood were great men, especially the author of "The Song of the Shirt." He had a good head and a fine heart. That song of his is better than many a sermon I've heard. "Punch" too is an acute censor, generally right in his castigations; a censor, but not censorious. When those who should lay the axe to the root of the tree won't do it, Providence raises up a buffoon, who preaches many a most rememberable sermon.

CHRYSOSTOM, the rhetorical St. John, had a curious affinity with the apostle; and in the John of the Gospel he saw the Boanerges. He begins his homilies on John most pictorially. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." *Ἀκούσατε πῶς βροντίζει*, says Chrysostom. Hear how he thunders!* As Bengel says, at

* The only parallel passage I find in Chrysostom is the

the same place, "This is the thunder brought down to us by a son of thunder." Chrysostom is the Christian Demosthenes. It is worth learning Greek only to read the golden-mouthed John. And what a noble life was his! *There* is a dissolute Byzantium, *here* is the uncompromising bishop; and almost daily did he preach in that city those glorious sermons of his. I do not know what the bishops of the East do now, but John Chrysostom was in his cathedral daily, preaching to crowded audiences, and he did not spare the lash, or fear to rebuke court vices. He came down upon the empress, the clergy, and the populace alike. His work was prior to that of Augustine (though they were contemporaries), and the doctrine of grace in its relation to free will had not yet been fully studied; and thus, though no Pelagian, in his expository ethics he often talks Arminian-like. But his Christology kept him right. On the person of Christ he speaks out with the voice of a trumpet. At his death he exclaimed, "That's glorious! that's glorious!" clapped his hands, and ventured to die.

[ORIGEN.]

I AM going to read him again carefully some day, for I don't think justice is done to him. Philo-Judæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Origen, were three remarkable Alexandrines. I'm particularly fond of the miscellaneous thinking of the "Stromata" of

following:—"ἡ μὲν οὖν βροντὴ καταπλήττει τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς ἄσημον ἔχουσα τὴν ἠχήν."—Hom. in Joan. I., § 2.

Clement and Tertullian. There are excellent things in Tertullian, but terribly crabbed African Latin. There is far too little study of these men in this age of superficiality. I don't blame the age; that is always a foolish thing to do. It has its function, and is probably fulfilling it. It is an age of diffusion, and theology is becoming popular; but we must always have a conservative few who take care of the folios. A man is not at liberty to live altogether out of his own age in theology; but when the church catholic has stamped a work with its peculiar seal, all theologians must become familiar with that work.

THE cultus of the ritualist, and of the old Scotch Seceder, are at opposite extremes. In the one we have the external form, often without the internal spirit. In the other we have the internal element, without the smallest regard to its outward form. But it is the ghost and the body together that make the *man.*

THE three best translations of the Bible, in my opinion, are, in order of merit, the English, the Dutch, and Diodati's Italian version. As to Luther's, he is admirable in rendering the prophets. He says either just what the prophets *did say*, or that which you see *at once* they *might have said.*

A MERELY æsthetic religion (such as that of Goethe, and all worshippers of the beautiful) is a miserable substitute for piety, and it

never stands the tear and wear of time, especially in the midst of great sorrows. It is the offspring of sentiment divorced from law; and that is an illegal divorce. The want of the legal is a fatal blot in theology, and a practical danger in religion. It will lead to a crude philanthropy, to moonlight views of God's government of the world. It has often led to a hazy latitudinarianism, or, to what is even worse, an exaggerated Antinomian evangelism: great raptures and gross viciousness going together; men thinking that they are so spiritual that their bodies may do what they like. But the æsthetic must not be eradicated; it must be supplemented. And it is the realisation of *the moral* in God, and the sense of sin in man—the sinner feeling that he is in the presence of a holy God—that is the only cure for its exaggerations. The æsthetic in religion is at bottom the bringing of religion to God, instead of bringing the soul to God to get religion. It is thus that men make a God of religion, instead of allowing religion to remain a worshipper of God. Let a man be in the presence of the most beautiful things which the universe contains, or be thrilled by that perfection of moral beauty which Scripture yields him, and then come to God in prayer, and he will find that the beauty he had realised has passed upwards through the sublime, and been lost in the majestic holiness. Is the æsthetic snare still felt? Well then, God says, *There's my Law:* "The soul that sinneth it shall die." Bring in *conscience.* If we lose conscience, we lose dignity: we become pulses,

not men. The mere poetry of religion by itself weakens the soul. It is the ἡδονή preferred to the ἀρετή. The "Tabula" of Cebes was far better than it. . . . And yet there is an æsthesis in all that God does, as well as in all that he is. God is an æsthetic being. Let me never forget that fact. The exceeding beauty of the floral world alone proves a certain similarity between the æsthetical nature of man and that of God. And the work of the Son, his very humiliation was beautiful, as well as true, and good. It is fair and lovely exceedingly to look upon. But the pursuit of holiness as so much personal adornment is a very subtile snare. I have been humbled by the detection of it. All such detections pain and lancinate the soul.

[How would you deal with it in another?]

I would say to him, Let the effort to clothe yourself with the raiment of the beautiful be changed into an effort to strip yourself. Humble yourself, and think of the Law.

THE vague cloudy men are always talking against intolerance. Why, our very calling is to be intolerant; intolerant of proved error, and known sin. The evil is that we are not intolerant enough, though, at the same time, we are not benevolent enough. A man, however, must have a clear eye and a large heart, before he has a right to be intolerant either towards concrete error or concrete sin. At the abstract he may hit as hard as he likes. Propositions don't feel pain.

THE fact that everywhere man makes for himself a God after his own image, is a suggestive hint of the counter-truth that God made man in his image. Idolatry is but man's helpless effort to get back to God, in whose image he was made; a proof of that which Augustine says so well—"Fecisti nos ad Te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in Te."—(Conf. I.)

MAN ever is, and must remain, a *volent,* or cease to be man. This much is man's indefectible prerogative. Yet this is neither a power of independency, nor is it a liberty of indifferency, though *what* it is I know not, and therefore cannot define. Motives always sway the will in every choice and in every volition; but I won't admit that, given the motives, you can tell the result infallibly, or even that the result is infallibly certain; that, for example, given the temptations of Satan, the fall of Adam was necessary. There is an indefinable power lodged in the will, which is its own causality. It was the abuse of our freedom that led to the fall. But it is not absolute pravity, but *de*pravity, that resulted. All would be dark if the former had ensued. A shadow would then run upwards to the very throne of God; but if the latter be the case, the darkness is only partial. Pravity would charge it upon God; depravity brings it down to man. And thus, though depraved, we are morally responsible. We could not be totally depraved and remain responsible. For, if man became sin, then, sure

enough, he would be unsalvable. Christ did not die for sin. He could not do that. He died for something deeper than sin. A lady once said to me, "The more I see of myself, I see nothing so properly mine as my sin." I said to her, "Well, you do not see deep enough. There is something far more properly yours than your sin; and your sin is improperly yours. It is a blot in your being, which, if you do not get quit of it, will never cease to be *unnatural* to you. No; the image of God is more properly yours, though you had no share in the production of it." Very many pious people do not rise high enough in their anthropology. They ascend to the fall, and forget the higher fact that we fell from a height where we were fitted to dwell, and where we were intended to remain. And Jesus Christ has come that He might raise us even higher than to that height, and make us sit in the "super-celestials" with Himself.

ONE man states a truth which may be one-sided. I state its counter-truth, anxious to escape from the one-sidedness of error. It is a strange thing that middle station between opposites. It is more than a *juste milieu.* It is the key-stone of an arch, which props the two sides; and, sure enough, it is no contradiction, if your *juste milieu* contradicts the two extremes. The key-stone of an arch is not antagonistic to the two sides it supports. Being itself neither the one nor the other, it upholds both.

IT was necessary that Christ should be a Jew. Had he not been of the Abrahamic line of descent, there would have been no connection between the Old and the New Testaments; and thus alone has he been able to fulfil the whole law. The Adamic is very shadowy without the Abrahamic and the Sinaitic. Christ was a Jew first, a Cosmopolitan afterwards.

[What was the exact force of Christ's being "made under the law?"]

He was made under the whole law of Israel, all law moral, and all law positive, that he might do away with the law ceremonial, and simplify the law moral and the law positive. And observe, we must all become Jews. That nation retains its hold of the world. There is an Israelitic naturalisation for us all. Salvation is of the Jews; and metaphorically we must all become Jews—*i.e.* we must enter into the Jewish heritage, and reverence the channel in which all our great blessings have come down to us. Why Christ preferred the humanity of the seed of Abraham no man dare say; but since he has done so, in this channel flow his gifts to the whole world. We are thus related not only to the God-man, but to the God-man Jew: and *hence* the abolition in Him of all the obligations of the ceremonial law (and of the moral law as "a covenant of works"), and the admission of Gentiles into the family of Abraham. The Abrahamic humanity being chosen in preference to any other, thereafter, "in thee, and *in thy seed*, shall all the families of the earth be blessed."

"If ye be Christ's," said the apostle, "then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." . . . In the incarnation, Christ took our flesh, that he might give us his spirit: and so, on our becoming Christians, we, in a theological sense, lose our personality, because there is but one σῶμα; *we* have no separate σῶμα. But we are the μέλη, of which Christ is the κεφαλή. But let us always reverence God's choice of Israel as the channel of our blessings. If Adamic blood flows in all our veins, Abrahamic blood flows spiritually in every Christian's veins. . . . It is curious that Jewish pride fastens on the particularism of the promise, and neglects its universalism; while Gentile pride fixes on its universalism, and ignores or forgets its equally significant particularism. . . . I do not see that the Christian Church is now under the theocratic law of the Jews, in respect even to those things in it which were good for all time, except that it is under the spirit of the ancient law. Take, for example, the *tithes* of the Jewish Church. We should be restoring the Judaical law, if we insisted on the maintenance of tithes; and if we restore this, we ought in consistency to restore the whole law. Only it might be argued from the Abrahamic custom, that tithes were patriarchal, and therefore of older date than the judicial law of the nation. But on the other hand, sacrifice, which was also patriarchal, is gone; because it was typical, and the type has been implemented. It will not do to bring us under bondage to any purely Jewish practice; while none of us are sufficiently

thankful to the Jews, or sufficiently reverence the spirit of Hebrew legislation. . . . I remember when that tenth chapter of Genesis gave me a fortnight's joy. To take the catalogue of the nations, before their dispersion, was surely a significant fact; to me it is wonderfully touching.

THE manifold variety of the Bible is to me quite as wonderful as its unity. There is scarcely a species of literature not represented in it. There is no order of magnificence, in poetry for example, which we do not find in Isaiah. He is sublimely tender, yet majestically stormy; and in his closing chapters he tyrannised over the Hebrew language to find words that could give fit expression to his thought; and yet it often seems to me as if he could not get full justice to himself in that language. Of course *he* didn't feel this; and I remember that his words were chosen, and in them a higher than Isaiah spoke. . . . Ezekiel is Carlylian. There's a wild, rugged, and abrupt sternness in Ezekiel. He stands midway between the majestic sublimity of Isaiah, and the elegiacs of Jeremiah. . . . The poetry of the sublime rises to its very highest level in Scripture, because we have the sublimity of form added to the sublimity of the theme. Its subject-matter is the very highest.

[The poetry of aspiration could never be so high as the poetry of revelation.]

Never: and the main characteristic of Scripture consists in its being a descent, a revela-

tion coming to man from God, and not the mere ascent of our nature to His. Yes; the sublime of Scripture lies in its being from God to man. All else goes from man up to God; or, up *not* to God. Simply as poetry, what a reach that is, "Let light be, and light was." It did not escape Longinus, who, because of it, calls Moses, *οὐχ ὁ τυχὼν ἀνήρ*.* And what is there finer in all secular literature, as poetry alone, than the song of the angels: "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, goodwill to men?" . . . It is a great gift to the Church that psalter of Israel. I never tire of the magnificent ancient poetry of the Jews. The way the psalmists speak of Nature is very touching, and their sympathy with the life of lower creatures: "The wild asses drink their fill." It is a grand thing that God appointed such a sentence to be sung in the Christian churches in all time to come.

MY *Ontologia Tripartita* { Substance existing.
Qualities subsisting.
Relation intersisting. }

All relation arises from a correspondence of qualities in different substances. Hence the whole of teleology. Many relations arise from the congruity of opposites; and from the unity which pervades the diversity of nature: the unity arising out of the aptitudes of the diverse.

THERE are enough of queries remaining as to Sir W. Hamilton's metaphysic, to start

* *περὶ ὕψους*, Sect. ix.

this reflection,—Has not the best thing that he has done for us been *to help us to put new questions?* To take one instance:—he says that "the conditioned is the mean between two extremes, neither of which can be conceived as possible, but of which one must be admitted as necessary."* One of these we must admit to be true, but *which* are we to choose? We must take *unum*, but this doesn't determine *uter?* . . . Again, does not the realist doctrine of an immediate perception of matter give a foothold to one claiming an immediate knowledge of God?

[Scarcely, for in the one case the objects (the infinite and the finite) are disparate; in the other (mind and matter) they are correlate.]

But if we have an immediate or presentative knowledge of *any* substance, this seems to attest the possibility of the Infinite revealing (*presenting*) Himself to the finite immediately, though in a finite manner. I maintain that a *perceptive* knowledge of God is possible to man.

[In that we speak, of course, through a figure, but we may drop the figure in the moment of perception.]

It need not be called a figure at all. We directly see Him. The pure in heart do so, when the eye is couched. "The Word was made manifest, and we beheld His glory." "God, who caused the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined into our hearts, to give us the light of the glory of God," etc. . . . And is not our nescience of God quite compatible with our intuition of Him? Our knowledge

* *Discussions.* Philosophy of Unconditioned, p. 14.

of the infinite object may not be adequate, yet true and sufficient; a "*communicatio*" due not to man's efforts to rise to God, but to an actual presentation of God to man (*gratia*). I am a realist in theology. Idealism in philosophy is representationism in theology, and that severs man from his Source.

THE LAW ordained, "Thou shalt love;" and love ordained that law. Man could not keep it, and love ordained a gospel; that gospel is "God so loved." Thus, "Thou shalt love" is the whole of the law; "God so loved" is the whole of the gospel. That is so clear, that it is at once law and gospel for children and for savages; but it is so deep in its limpid clearness that no philosopher can fathom it.

PHILOSOPHY and Criticism must correct the crudities of spontaneous thinking. That I admit. But what is to correct the philosophy and criticism? ..

[Itself—*i.e.* a deeper and ever-deepening philosophy and criticism.]

But where are you to get them? Have we not seen an end of *all* perfection?

[If the light that is in us be altogether darkness, it's sad; but it is hopeless and helpless.]

It cannot be altogether darkness. The eye to receive and recognise the light remains, but we must "come unto the light." You see I hold that a light which we once had, has been put out. Is the doctrine of the fall credible? Is the

fact possible? If so, what is to be its evidence? It cannot be consciousness, for it is a fact of the past. If true, it is a historical event, for the proof of which we must fall back upon Testimony. Well, I find this testimony in history, and I see its evidence everywhere; while nothing that I see contradicts it, and my consciousness confirms it. I, remaining a man, might have much subtracted from my nature without losing it; and I too, remaining a man, might have much superadded to my nature, changing it even into another image, but only enhancing it.

HEGEL'S system is Saturnian. It devours its own offspring. Pure being and pure nothing being identical (*Seyn = Nichts* and nichts = seyn), philosophy must give up the ghost. Hegelianism is philosophical suicide starting from apotheosis.

[But as every philosophical error is the distortion of a truth, is not Hegel's doctrine intelligible thus far—that absolute existence or "pure being," devoid of attributes or manifestations, is to us the same as no being, because we can predicate nothing of it?]

I do not understand the doctrine that *seyn* and *nichts* are identical, and yet that the one passes into and disappears in the other; the nichts = seyn passes into it, and becomes its *werden* (and manifestation ensues); and again the seyn = nichts passes back into it (and annihilation takes place). If that differs in any essential from Pantheism, I cannot understand it. I understand the Pantheistic theory, and a Sabellian

theory of God, but not the Hegelian. All *existence* is being out of or from God. But is the whole record of the universe only the expiration and the inspiration of the Infinite essence? You might demonstrate a God after this fashion; but what sort of a God would he be? *Der?* or *Das?* which of the two? To Hegel the problem of Being is as a problem in algebra; to me it is a supremely moral problem.

IS light substantial? I think it is. The imponderables may be imponderable only to us, because our balances are inadequate. The photographic power of light is a marvellous mystery. But some one has said that everything that is done is photographed. In morals that is a truth of great moment, but it is not a high motive to right-doing. The great Photographer records our acts, and preserves the record; but we must love the right, because it is lovely; and do the right, because of its loveableness.

[SMOKE SEEN RISING FROM AMIDST TREES.]

THAT'S finely suggestive of human life.

[Some one remarked, "Yes, like a vapour it vanisheth."]

But that's not what I am thinking of. It also suggests that there is *life there, though unseen.*

I CAN certainly conceive of an intellect which had no idea of either God or Duty, but

could nevertheless understand the relations of things, and could reason syllogistically—a mere intellectuality devoid of spirituality. But I can see that this world would not be its proper residence. Analogous to this would be the possession of senses for pure intellection, without the accompaniments of pain or pleasure; a rose and assafœtida might be distinguishable without the attraction or repulsion of their sensations; and this perception of difference might proceed, not from the form of the objects compared, or any other quality, but from the sensations themselves.

[But these were supposed to be neutral or colourless.]

Neutral as to pleasure and pain, but not colourless or undistinguishable in themselves. An eye for the mere form without the beauty of objects, would be another somewhat analogous case to an intellect without a moral sense; for I think the moral sense is somewhat analogous to the painter's eye, and to the musician's ear, in their finer discernments. I do not know whether it would be for the good of the universe that such beings should exist, though I cannot deny the possibility of their existence. But certainly they were not meant for this world.

PROGRESS is altogether a relative term. It depends on the point from which a man has set out; and on whether he is going up the hill or down it. If I begin from Atheism, I have progressed when I become a Pantheist,

and I have got a step higher when I am a Theist, though I have a great many steps still to take. But if I begin with being a Christian, and descend to the level of a Deist, the Pantheist who has come up from beneath is higher than I. It is a terrible thing to have moved from the Rock of Ages, and to be going downwards. . . . When I am asked what I think of a man's position, in reference to God's truth, I always ask in reply—What was it some time ago? What did he start from? (of course it is of the man's position as a seeker of the truth, and not of the truth itself, that I am speaking). I want to know if his face is set in the right way, if he is looking toward God, or away from God. You see we are on a solemn journey at all times; and *the direction we are taking* is of greater consequence than the point we have reached; for our journey is an endless one.

"OTHER sheep I have, which are not of this fold." They are of course the Gentile nations—not other beings than men. The latter notion implies a vast misunderstanding of the ends and destinies of this creation, as well as of the Incarnation and Death of the Son of God. The *wonderfulness of man* is forgotten. It is improbable that there is any other race like his. These speculations on "more worlds than one" are theologically very vague. I think that many seek for magnitude *extensive* in the work of Christ, in a considerable measure from not seeing its magnitude *intensive.* It is no shock

to reason that Christ should have come amongst us, when you realise the origin of man. And the manifestation which God has made does not need to be repeated. . . . When I say it's improbable that there is another race like man's, of course all I say is, that it is not at all likely—or every way unlikely—I don't make dogmatic assertions. But is not the *fall* of man also intensified by its uniqueness? . . . . That is a splendid burst of Edward Irving's on world-despising: "Despise man's world! the masterpiece of God's creation! the temple of creation's God!" I confess I have more sympathy with that sentence than with all Brewster's thousand worlds. Sir David's book is full of rash theology. Whewell's mind is evidently more subdued to a philosophical calmness. He keeps his likings and his dislikings out of it. It is clear that the inhabitants of the planetary worlds cannot resemble *us.* I suppose the question would be whether they might belong to the genus "men," though not of our species, with an intellectual and moral nature resembling man's, and possibly inhabiting material bodies. But we cannot possibly know.

SPECULATIVE STUDY has an essential value at all times. If we are to be freed from error as well as from evil, we must speculate, we must interrogate and ponder; and having obtained answers to our queries, turn our answers into questions again. Speculation makes man's spirit active in a noble sense. It

rouses from quiescence ; and intellectual torpor is a form of death.

THE mystery of the origin of evil is less oppressive to me, both when I look into the nature of sin, and find it to be a privation of good; and when I discover that the beginning, middle, and end of the Divine plan is to abolish and destroy it for evermore.

[Does not the gift of free-will contain a partial solution ?]

How so ?

[If the will is free, the fall is possible, and the mystery is thrown back into the enigma of free-will.]

But it does not follow that possibilities must be realised ; or that the creation of possibilities makes the creator answerable for their realisation. God is responsible for the history of his universe, so far as it does not contain free-wills within it, and yet these wills are not cut off from his jurisdiction.

[Whence comes their freedom of will, if not from God, unless they are God's equals, and creative sources ?]

The freedom of will proceeds from God. God is the source of every free as well as of every determined act ; but he is not the cause of the evil that is in acts, whether free or determined. Because the evil has, strictly speaking, no author. God is the cause of good, of all good, and of good only.

[Would you say then, that if by two chains let down from Deity you represent on the one

hand the sequences of nature, and the other the acts of human wills, the Divine efficiency was equal in both?]

Dubito: an electric shock passing through nature is very different from Divine grace acting on human wills. We are clay in the hands of the potter: but the will is not passive clay, and it is not passive when first permeated by the causal power of God. In answer to your question I say, I think not; but *dubito.*

MANY of our old Scottish divines are deeper men than they get credit for. Some of them belong to the class of the "forgotten philosophers;" but, because they were first of all divines, their acute philosophy is overlooked. For example, Gib's essay in answer to the philosophical necessity of Lord Kames is a most ingenious piece of writing.

[FACTS AND LAWS IN THEOLOGY.]

IT is the fashion of our time to decry Systematic Theology, but that is tantamount to the dislike of science.

[If the theology be scientific, no one will object.]

But there is Isaac Taylor; he would keep us to facts alone, and not allow us to arrange our facts and make science of them by interpretation and comparison, and the discovery of laws.

[Some of the facts won't yield laws, for they are ultimate.]

Well, it is part of the province of theology to prove that, so far as it is true.

[And to reverence the facts as greater than the laws.]

No: the laws are as great as the facts, wherever they have been deduced by God-inspired men. And there is a fine analogy between science and theology. A world is made, and science is incipient. A revelation is made, and theology is incipient. You quarry facts, and place them, cut and polished, in the temple of science; and you gather other facts, and build them into the temple of Systematic Theology.

THE key-note to the book of the Acts of the Apostles lies in the word ἤρξατο of the first verse. That ἤρξατο is not pleonastic. It is the acts "which Jesus began," but *has not finished*. Therefore, the Acts of the Apostles are still Christ's acts in them, and we might say the same of the acts of those members of the Church which constitute this body.

IT is curious that some men have a constitutionally weak conscience, and the sphere in which they move tends to weaken it more, if infirm at the first. A litterateur's conscience is, I suspect, a somewhat rare phenomenon. His temptations are almost greater than the lawyer's. . . . . Comte's fundamental want is the want of conscience. If you can conceive a perfect intellection of phenomena without a conscience, that is the attainment of Comte. . . . . The distinction between condignity and congruity might satisfy a Schoolman's conscience, but it does not satisfy mine.

THE marvels of the faculty of memory are inexhaustible. But it is as wonderful that we should ever *forget* anything, as that we

should remember some things. It is surpassingly strange how thought A should suggest thought B. We speak of the laws of association; but they are only a veil to our ignorance. . . . . I think that both future reward and future punishment will be largely accomplished by the opening of the floodgates of memory. It is a terrible thought that a man *might* be left to the agony of his own reminiscence for ever.

[The Proletariat.]

OWEN and Proudhon have a measure of truth in their sociology. Red republicanism is not entirely false: but red republicanism is not the cure for humanity. It is too physical. Chalmers comes far nearer the truth, in his noble understanding of political and civic economy. The reformatory and ragged school are grand social engines. And it is a good idea that of gathering thieves together; professional thieves invited to meet with each other, and no honest men admitted. I should like to address a company of thieves. It is strange how, out of the dark abyss, a little flame of the better life will sometimes sparkle up of a sudden; and there are a few grains of wheat usually in the fields that are fullest of tares. I have heard of a professional thief giving a very large donation to a society for the suppression of crime, saying as he sent it, "I am by profession a thief; but yours is a good society, and deserves the support of all honest men." The homage which the bad give to the principle of goodness is also seen in this, that bad men almost always wish their children to be good.

ROUSSEAU, with his offensive vanity and literary pride, had a curious respect for Christ. With a good bit of the devil in him, he believed and trembled. But I believe that he believed that sentence in his vague and cloudy panegyric on Christ to be true:—"If the son of Sophroniscus was a hero, the son of Mary was a God." The "faith of the devils" lies latent in many a mind for an emergency. As one prayed when his ship was sinking, "O God, if there be a God, have mercy on my soul, if I have a soul." . . . . It seems to be a common thing for men to take up religion when sick, or when in peril at sea. I would like to see deeper into that. *Why* does our common life hide from us realities which come flashing in upon us in peril? . . . . In fishermen, as a class familiar with the perils of the deep, there is strong natural *religiosity.* But in sailors you find the reverse. Furlough in port too often destroys them.

I LIKE direct practical preaching, which helps me to live as a pilgrim on a journey. Now some preach as if they were telling how to make shoes, instead of making them; as if they were describing the process of shoemaking to those who want to be shod. They would have their hearers all taught to be capital shoemakers, while you want to be a shoe-wearer. They tell you all about the leather, and the rosin, and the awl; while it's a rough road for bare feet and cold, that you must traverse constantly.

IF words gave way, and broke down with St. Paul, when he attempted to state the

Great Mystery in his inspired words, *à fortiori* must they break down with us when we are dealing with transcendent truths. Paul said, "It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me;" and, "I live, yet not I, but Christ that liveth in me;" and both of these sayings of his touch on the unsayable. . . . . Augustine says, "Let no one ask of me where God was before He created the world. He was Himself Time. He was Himself Space." This is the nearest approach to saying the unsayable that I know of. But there are two kinds of perplexity. The first arises when the theme itself is slippery as an eel, and glides from us altogether: the second when, in our attempt to solve it, or to grapple with it, it gives out its mystery as if it raised a great cuttle-fish obscurity around it.

MY supreme answer to Pantheism is a moral one, and is based upon the fact of sin. I ask the Pantheist, first, is sin real? Is it a moral antithesis and discord in man's life? And then I ask him, is that which involves a discord, the outcome of the infinite *One?* The forthflow of the one life of the universe must contain no ultimately and irreconcilably jarring elements. Now sin and holiness are antithetic, and you cannot connect them by tracing them back to a common fountain-head. Therefore, I say, the universe has not been evolved.

GOD will neither take the blame of sin, nor alienate or split the praise of grace.

THE Lord's Table is not ours. We of a particular sect may fence it round, but we have a duty to the church catholic in respect of intercommunion with our brethren. We must not be schismatical, any more than we may be heretical.

THERE is an immense power in Christianity to evoke naturally latent power. There is nothing that I know of so powerful to call out the "mute inglorious Miltons." It gives tongue to them.

INQUIRE whether or not there is a narrow stream of Christian doctrine persistent through the ages, though often troubled, and sometimes polluted, and frequently unseen. If so, then I would say this stream had come from the living well. Inquire.

"FULFIL yourself," is the vague and cloudy cry of some shallow analysts of man's nature. Fulfil *what?* Again I ask, *Fulfil what?* Your fallen nature, or the new creature? The summons to let your nature, whatever it may be, get free play, with all its corrupted instincts, is a summons to pandemonium. Let men start from the καινὴ κτίσις, and the fulfilment of that is the perfection and completion of man.

I'M a thinking being, and I must and will think against Dr. G——, and against all mankind. But I must and will do it reverently.

AN architectonic intellect is a magnificent endowment. Its function is to arrange the materials of knowledge; but it cannot quarry the stones. This the intuitionalist must do.

AFTER all the arguments upon the evidences that I have read, all that any man has ever brought forward, and after all that I could bring forward as to my own immediate grounds of belief, though I were to write a volume on the subject, I would feel the whole to be incomplete, without "the inspiration of the Almighty, which gives us understanding." But it would be an awful thing to live within a fatherless universe. As Abraham Tucker writes of one— "He travelled to the utmost outskirts of creation; he saw the socket where the eye should have been, and he heard the shriek of a fatherless universe." The poetry of religion will not lift a man out of that abyss, and reveal to him a Father in the midst of it. We must come to the moral law, and to the revelation of Jesus Christ. . . . Sin and Death, Θάνατος and Ἁμαρτία cast two shadows over man in this life, which give the lie to a religion merely of the beautiful.

DEATH is the severance of things which were once united, and which were meant to remain united. God is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the body; and death spiritual severs the first connection, as death physical cuts the second. But neither of the two is natural; and as provision is made for

the reunion of the former, we might conjecture by analogy that some provision for the latter is in store. We may not ignore the material element in our prospects of immortality. It makes some difference to a man, if his hopes for the future derive some nourishment from the "piece of a broiled fish and of an honeycomb." I would be inclined to say that a Christianity without that hope wants bone. It may be vital, but it wants the organic skeleton of strength; while the Christianity that looks too much to it is *all bone.*

I WOULD say to the theologian, Be biblical first of all; study the biblical, then study the ecclesiastical; and study the two with the presumption that they are coincident, till you find that they diverge. As the biblical gave birth to the ecclesiastical, surely this presumption is justifiable. Many men of the robustest intellects, and of the deepest piety and consecration of life, have for centuries been dealing with one Book, and they notably agree in their landmarks. . . . The creeds are to me next in value to the Scriptures. Undoubtedly, of all human compositions they are most precious. They are to the student of theology what the juridical codes are to the student of law.

[Does not the ecclesiastical correspond rather to the commentaries on the codes of statute law?]

Well, the law student could not get on without these commentaries. They enlighten and do not darken the codes. And so does the ecclesiastical cast light upon the biblical. I

understand, though I do not sympathise with, the un-ecclesiastical mind; but I like those who, from the ecclesiastical starting-point, wish to advance farther.

[The Development Theory.]

I DO not think the "development theory" offers any very terrible results to the theologian, but I maintain it is not scientifically made out. Where is your half-formed geologic man? Analogy would lead you to expect that some fossil man, half-made, and in the process of development from the stage immediately below, should exist entombed. Where is he? Why have we no fossil link? There are no existing species which shade into each other by insensible degrees. And development could not have gone on as *by leaps*. So far as scientific evidence has as yet gone, I consider species to be distinct creations.

[It seems the grander idea, and equally theistic, to suppose development to be the law of the Divine action.]

How then can we avoid the doctrine of emanation?

[Suppose we concede it in things physical, and deny it, on the ground of free will, in the spiritual region?]

Of the two, I would rather believe that spirit had emanated from spirit, than matter from spirit.

[I mean that the material world, being created by God, was left to evolve its own powers of life, according to a "pre-established harmony;"

but that when man appeared a new agency was introduced. He was not developed as to his soul, but as to his body he may have been. Suppose each species to be a new creation, the creation would proceed according to law; and so development would remain.]

That is, you put it out at the front door, and take it in at the back. I admit that evolution is not atheistic: but I deny that there is any scientific evidence for it. And I think we should have something better than a guess or a conjecture in a matter so weighty.

[The Supernatural.]

IT is a mistake to say that every common event is as divine as any miracle could be, because God is necessarily its author. Ordinary law and common events are scarcely the signs of monotheism, never of Jehovism. Still less could they be the indices of the incarnation. God's agency is at work in every atom and in each event ceaselessly; but every event is not so well adapted to be a sign of his working, a signal to man that Jehovah is acting in a special manner, and is communicating somewhat.

IN all religious movements, especially when they become excited and widespread, I would insist on family worship being at once established. Willingness to begin it, and to prefer it to excited meetings, is a good criterion. You approach to the cultus of Rome, if you have no altar in the house. It is an unhuman thing to substitute a daily ministry for the family wor-

ship of God ; and daily meetings of many, even for devotion, are not always to be encouraged. I should consider a widespread regard for household worship always a good sign of a community.

I CANNOT part with my transcendentalism ; but the mere transcendentalist would rob me of that which is most precious, the συγκατάβασις of Scripture diction. God is only realisable by the manifestations He has made of Himself, in word and in deed, and it is a suggestive thought that if God were nameless he could not be loved. . . . We are *bound* reverently to inquire in God's temple (and we need not care whether we always enter by the gate called Beautiful, or no) ; yet we come to a point where we must pause before the Divine mysteries, and simply adore them ; while there is a fine modesty that postpones many questions till we have passed the judgment-seat.

There is something in the idea that the Fall was a prophecy of the Incarnation (though it tends to a mystic supra-lapsarianism). It is not entirely true, but there is something in it. But the controversy between supra- and infra-lapsarianism is beyond our power to determine. As speculative systems, the former accords most with the reason, the latter with the heart and feelings.

A VERY usual way for God to bring down the lofty, whether in Church or State, is to allow them to dig a pit, and then to fall therein.

THERE is a point at which Calvinism and Universalism are one. They have a common principle, or rather there is a principle in Calvinism, which, if it is contemplated exclusively, leads of necessity to Universalism; and that is "the exceeding great love wherewith He hath loved us." If we start from that, and take nothing but that; if we do not take God's sovereignty along with it, we are inevitably Universalists. But we must combine it with sovereignty and freedom. That exceeding great love contains all that is common to Calvinism and Universalism. Since God loved us, after our revolt, if he did nothing more, a universal amnesty would have been proclaimed. And we neither diminish the fact of the universal love, nor forget the fact of his sovereignty. But it is curious to me that the Arminian theology seems to provide for the possibility of a perpetual refusal on the part of man, and rushes into the very snare it seeks to escape. . . . It may also be said to be a bribe to procrastination; for if we have the power to turn round at any time, why should we be in a hurry about it?

[Because delay makes the act more difficult, through the force of habit the other way.]

But we have the more powerful lever who assert that the act is impossible at any time without the χάρις, which is always at hand.

[Still, if that is available at any time, the systems are balanced.]

No: because no man may presume upon its bestowment, or claim it as a right, or complain if it be withheld. As to the action of the will

in our renewal, I maintain that the τὸ θέλειν is wholly man's, the ἐνέργεια is altogether God's. So far as I have any system about it, it rests on these two grounds—1st, That a being created perfectly good, and maintained so up to this instant, does not, for all that, in matters of duty necessarily act well; that he needs supernatural grace: and 2d, That this grace is sovereign. The propositions that grace is necessary, and that it is sovereign, sum up my belief regarding it.

THE devil-worship of the East is not worship but fear; and founded in part on the tradition of the Persians, that he is a banished courtier, who may be restored by and by, though at present in disgrace; and that it is well, on the whole, to be on good terms with him!

ALL that is in God is in Him infinitely. *Hence* it is that there is no prosopolepsy (respect of persons) in Him. And hence the difference between the Divine and human will,—independency being inconsistent with the nature of human will, and predicable only of the Divine. Hence also the irrestrictive freedom of grace. . . . It is difficult to define the exact shade of difference between the Semi-Pelagian and the Arminian. Semi-Pelagianism, as I take it, affirms the power of nature, with the aid of universally vouchsafed grace, to effect renewal. The Arminianism of Arminius himself, of Curcellæus, and of Wesley (though not of Episcopius), affirms that no irregenerate man can do that which is spirit-

ually good unless the Divine Spirit aids him. But both systems are synergistic. There is a difference, however, between an Arminianising Calvinist, and a Calvinising Arminian.

DOES need or love draw most? I think need; though at the bottom of it you generally find a grain or two of love.

I ASK, What was Christ's errand into the world? For surely our errand into the world must be deeply connected with his. And I often think of that saying of his, "It is more blessed to give than to receive," in connection not only with our duty to others, but with our duty to Him. We must not only imitate Him, we must concede to Him this superior blessedness of giving to us. And the noblest thing a man can do is, just humbly to receive, and then to go amongst others and give. I've not been able to give much. It's because I have received so little. And if there is anything in which I would be inclined to contradict Him, it would be if I heard Him say, "Well done, good and faithful servant."

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THE END.

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